This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Uncommitted Couples: Some Efficiency and Policy Implications of Marital Bargaining Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Saku Aura () (Department of Economics, University of Missouri-Columbia )
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
This paper studies married couples dynamic investment and consumption choices under the assumption that the couple cannot commit across time to not to renegotiate their decisions. The inefficiencies that can arise are characterized. Efficiency properties of different divorce asset division regimes are examined. A stylized common law regime is shown to lead to a fully efficiency in a simple model while it is shown that under community property regime the couple is unlikely to attain full efficiency. The effect of inability to commit across time on the savings level is examined under a tractable special case of the model.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Missouri in its series Working Papers with number
0217.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length: 33 pgs.
Date of creation: 25 Sep 2002Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:umc:wpaper:0217Contact details of provider: Postal: 118 Professional Building, Columbia, MO 65211 Phone: (573) 882-0063 Fax: (573) 882-2697 Web page: http://economics.missouri.edu/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Mark Stratton).
Keywords: Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Esther Duflo, 2000.
"Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old Age Pension and Intra-household Allocation in South Africa ,"
NBER Working Papers
8061, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Browning, Martin, 2000.
" The Saving Behaviour of a Two-Person Household ,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 102(2), pages 235-51, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Dnes, Antony W., 1999.
"Applications of economic analysis to marital law: concerning a proposal to reform the discretionary approach to the division of marital assets in England and Wales ,"
International Review of Law and Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 533-552, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Shelly Lundberg & Richard Startz & Steven Stillman, 2001.
"The Retirement-Consumption Puzzle: A Marital Bargaining Approach ,"
Working Papers
01-04, RAND Corporation Publications Department.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Shelly J. Lundberg & Jennifer Ward-Batts, 2000.
"Saving for Retirement: Household Bargaining and Household Net Worth ,"
Working Papers
wp004, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Shelly J. Lundberg & Jennifer Ward-Batts, 2000.
"Saving for Retirement: Household Bargaining and Household Net Worth ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1414, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!] Shelly Lundberg & Jennifer Ward-Batts, 2000.
"Saving for Retirement: Household Bargaining and Household Net Worth ,"
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington
0026, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
[Downloadable!] Shelly Lundberg & Jennifer Ward-Batts, 2000.
"Saving for Retirement: Household Bargaining and Household Net Worth ,"
Working Papers
0026, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2000.
"Mutual Insurance, Individual Savings and Limited Commitment ,"
Review of Economic Dynamics ,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 216-246, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Becker, Gary S, 1973.
"A Theory of Marriage: Part I ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug..
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Becker, Gary S, 1974.
"A Theory of Marriage: Part II ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(2), pages S11-S26, Part II, .
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Gary S. Becker, 1974.
"A Theory of Marriage: Part II ,"
NBER Chapters ,
in: Marriage, Family, Human Capital, and Fertility, pages 11-26
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] Aura, Saku, 2005.
"Does the balance of power within a family matter? The case of the Retirement Equity Act ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1699-1717, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980.
"Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis ,"
International Economic Review ,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981.
"Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand ,"
International Economic Review ,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-49, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988.
"Rational Household Labor Supply ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lundberg, S.J. & Pollak, R.A. & Wales, T.J., 1994.
"Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from U.K. Child Benefit ,"
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington
94-6, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
Other versions:
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Gonzalez, Libertad & Özcan, Berkay, 2008.
"The Risk of Divorce and Household Saving Behavior ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
3726, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Robert A. Pollak, 2007.
"Family Bargaining and Taxes: A Prolegomenon to the Analysis of Joint Taxation ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
3109, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Jon Strand, 2005.
"Individual and Household Values of Mortality Reductions with Intrahousehold Bargaining ,"
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty ,
Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 217-236, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Helmut Rainer, 2003.
"Should We Write Prenuptial Contracts? ,"
Economics Discussion Papers
572, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Helmut Rainer, 2005.
"Should We Write Prenuptial Contracts? ,"
Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics
0514, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews.
[Downloadable!] Rainer, Helmut, 2007.
"Should we write prenuptial contracts? ,"
European Economic Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 337-363, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Shelly Lundberg & Robert Pollak, 2003.
"Efficiency in Marriage ,"
Review of Economics of the Household ,
Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 153-167, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Robert A. Pollak, 2005.
"Bargaining Power in Marriage: Earnings, Wage Rates and Household Production ,"
NBER Working Papers
11239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Access and
download statistics Did you know? Each page is provided with a technical contact, in case something is not right with the supplied information. See under "publisher info".
This page was last updated on 2009-11-3.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .