This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Gender Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Alberto Alesina
Andrea Ichino
Loukas Karabarbounis

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Gender Based Taxation (GBT) satisfies Ramsey's optimal criterion by taxing less the more elastic labor supply of women. This holds when different elasticities between men and women are taken as exogenous and primitive. We study GBT in a model in which, instead, elasticity differences emerge endogenously from the bargained allocation of family duties. We explore two polar cases, which summarize the channels through which GBT affects an economy encompassing a wider set of possible reasons for gender differences. In the first case, the allocation of family chores is uneven between spouses because men have a superior bargaining power. In the second, instead, women take up more chores because they have a comparative advantage in household activities. We show how GBT emerges as an optimal policy tool as result of the interaction between incentives within the family and the Ramsey criterion, which is internalized by the government but not by household members.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13638.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 13638.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Nov 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13638

Note: LS PE
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

This item is featured on the following reading lists:
  1. Economic Logic blog
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 437-67, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Apps, Patricia F. & Rees, Ray, 1988. "Taxation and the household," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 355-369, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Alberto Alesina & Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, 2005. "Work and Leisure in the U.S. and Europe: Why So Different?," NBER Working Papers 11278, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Becker, Gary S, 1985. "Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages S33-58, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Albanesi, Stefania & Olivetti, Claudia, 2007. "Gender Roles and Technological Progress," CEPR Discussion Papers 6352, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Peter Gottfried & Wolfram Richter, 1999. "The Tax Unit and Household Production: Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(2), pages 404-409, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2006. "The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples," NBER Working Papers 12685, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Vermeulen, Frederic, 2002. " Collective Household Models: Principles and Main Results," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(4), pages 533-64, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Patricia Apps & Ray Rees, 2007. "The Taxation of Couples," IZA Discussion Papers 2910, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Boskin, Michael J. & Sheshinski, Eytan, 1983. "Optimal tax treatment of the family: Married couples," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 281-297, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: Tax Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 261-78, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Rolf Aaberge & Ugo Colombino, 2006. "Designing Optimal Taxes with a Microeconometric Model of Household Labour Supply," IZA Discussion Papers 2468, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Alberto Alesina & Paola Giuliano, 2007. "The Power of the Family," IZA Discussion Papers 2750, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Hanno Lustig & Stijn Van Nieuwerburg & Adrien Verdelhan, 2007. "The Wealth-Consumption Ratio: A Litmus Test for Consumption-based Asset Pricing Models¤," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2007-030, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  17. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production: I--Production Efficiency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 8-27, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Thomas, D., 1989. "Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach," Papers 586, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  19. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage: Part II," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(2), pages S11-S26, Part II, . [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. Claudia Goldin, 2006. "The Quiet Revolution That Transformed Women's Employment, Education, and Family," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 1-21, May. [Downloadable!]
  21. Andrea Ichino & Enrico Moretti, 2006. "Biological Gender Differences, Absenteeism and the Earning Gap," IZA Discussion Papers 2207, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  22. Robert A. Pollak, 2007. "Family Bargaining and Taxes: A Prolegomenon to the Analysis of Joint Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 3109, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  23. Blundell, Richard & Macurdy, Thomas, 1999. "Labor supply: A review of alternative approaches," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1559-1695 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  24. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Browning, M. & Bourguignon, F. & Chiappori, P.A. & Lechene, V., 1992. "Incomes and Outcomes: A structural Model of Intra-Household Allocation," DELTA Working Papers 92-23, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    Other versions:
  26. Piggott, John & Whalley, John, 1996. "The Tax Unit and Household Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(2), pages 398-418, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  27. Mark Aguiar & Erik Hurst, 2007. "Measuring Trends in Leisure: The Allocation of Time over Five Decades," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(3), pages 969-1006, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  28. Stefania Albanesi & Claudia Olivetti, 2006. "Home Production, Market Production and the Gender Wage Gap: Incentives and Expectations," NBER Working Papers 12212, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  29. Leora Friedberg & Anthony Webb, 2006. "Determinants and Consequences of Bargaining Power in Households," Working Papers, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College wp2006-13, Center for Retirement Research, revised Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
  30. Atkinson, A. B. & Stiglitz, J. E., 1972. "The structure of indirect taxation and economic efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 97-119, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  31. Claudia Goldin, 2006. "The Quiet Revolution that Transformed Women's Employment, Education, and Family," NBER Working Papers 11953, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  32. Lundberg, S.J. & Pollak, R.A. & Wales, T.J., 1994. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from U.K. Child Benefit," Working Papers 94-6, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  33. Leora Friedberg & Anthony Webb, 2006. "Determinants and Consequences of Bargaining Power in Households," NBER Working Papers 12367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  34. M. Browning & P. A. Chiappori, 1998. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(6), pages 1241-1278, November.
    Other versions:
  35. Brett, Craig, 1998. "Tax reform and collective family decision-making," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 425-440, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  36. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  37. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-49, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  38. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-58, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  39. Apps, Patricia & Rees, Ray, 1999. "On the taxation of trade within and between households," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 241-263, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Georg Wernhart & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, 2008. "Do Austrian Men and Women Become more Equal? At Least in Terms of Labor Supply!," Economics working papers 2008-05, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria. [Downloadable!]
  2. Karsten Staehr, 2008. "Estimates of employment and welfare effects of personal labour income taxation in a flat-tax country : The case of Estonia," Bank of Estonia Working Papers 2008-03, Bank of Estonia, revised 30 Oct 2008. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alessandra Casarico & Alessandro Sommacal, 2008. "Labor Income Taxation, Human Capital and Growth: The Role of Child Care," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Patricia Apps & Ray Rees, 2008. "Testing the Pareto Efficiency of Household Resource Allocations," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  5. de la Rica, Sara & Dolado, Juan José & García-Peñalosa, Cecilia, 2008. "On Gender Gaps and Self-fulfilling Expectations: Theory, Policies and Some Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 3553, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Haan, Peter & Navarro, Dolores, 2008. "Optimal Income Taxation of Married Couples: An Empirical Analysis of Joint and Individual Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 3819, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  7. Peter Haan & Dolores Navarro, 2008. "Optimal Income Taxation of Married Couples: An Empirical Analysis of Joint and Individual Taxation," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 838, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Patricia Apps, 2009. "Tax Reform, Targeting and the Tax Burden on Women," CEPR Discussion Papers 609, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. [Downloadable!]
  9. Chéron, Arnaud & Hairault, Jean-Olivier & Langot, François, 2008. "Age-Dependent Employment Protection," IZA Discussion Papers 3851, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  10. Alison L. Booth & Melvyn B. Coles, 2008. "Tax Policy and Returns to Education," CEPR Discussion Papers 591, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to register as authors.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.