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Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Reply

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Author Info
McElroy, Marjorie B
Horney, Mary Jean
Abstract

Pierre-Andre Chiappori's (1988) claim that the Nash-bargaining model is of "weak empirical relevance" and "neither convenient nor really restrictive" is incorrect. Nash-bargained household behavior implies a rich set of empirical implications extending well beyond the Pareto efficiency of intrafamily distributions. By systematically accounting for the impact of opportunities outside the family on resource distribution within the family, Nash-bargained demand theory considerably expands the scope of neoclassical demand theory. Such expansion can elucidate issues ranging from the impact of alimony and child support laws in developed societies to the intrafamily distribution of nutrition in less developed countries. Copyright 1990 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 31 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 237-42
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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:31:y:1990:i:1:p:237-42

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  1. Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni, 2006. "Learning from a Piece of Pie: The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining," IZA Discussion Papers 2128, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Daniela Del Boca & Christopher J. Flinn, 2006. "Modes of Spousal Interaction and the Labor Market Environment," IZA Discussion Papers 2005, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Valérie Lechene & Ian Preston, 2007. "Demand properties in household Nash equilibrium," IFS Working Papers W07/01, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
  4. Xu, Zeyu, 2007. "A survey on intra-household models and evidence," MPRA Paper 3763, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2005. "Bargaining Power and Equilibrium Consumption," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  6. Sonia R Bhalotra & Chris Heady, 2000. "Child Farm Labour: Theory and Evidence," STICERD - Development Economics Papers 24, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  7. Aniela Wirz, 2004. "To my Wife, with Love! Does Within-household Specialisation Explain Husbands' Better Job-education-match?," KOF Working papers 04-93, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
  8. Haller, H., 1995. "Household Decisions and Equilibrium Efficiency," Discussion Paper 63, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  9. Valerie Lechene & Ian Preston, 2005. "Household Nash Equilibrium with Voluntarily Contributed Public Goods," Economics Series Working Papers 226, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Bargain, Olivier & Moreau, Nicolas, 2005. "Cooperative Models in Action: Simulation of a Nash-Bargaining Model of Household Labor Supply with Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 1480, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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