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Collective Models of Family Behaviour: Implications for Economic Policy

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  • Shelley A. Phipps
  • Peter S. Burton

Abstract

Many economists have until fairly recently treated the family as a "black box" -- analysing the behaviour of "the family" rather than of the individuals within the family. In this paper, we outline the new "collective" approach to modelling family behaviour which makes explicit the fact that families consist of individuals with different tastes and different experiences who may sometimes be in conflict with one another. This paper argues that new developments in the economics of the family are of interest to policy-makers because many policy conclusions are sensitive to the model of the family which is adopted. We illustrate the importance of the collective approach to decisions about child-support guidelines, automatic withholding of support payments, child benefits, cash versus kind transfers, and individual versus family taxation.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Toronto Press in its journal Canadian Public Policy.

Volume (Year): 22 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 129-143

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Handle: RePEc:cpp:issued:v:22:y:1996:i:2:p:129-143

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References

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  1. Barbara Bergmann, 1995. "Becker's theory of the family: Preposterous conclusions," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(1), pages 141-150.
  2. Jerry A. Hausman & Paul Ruud, 1984. "Family Labor Supply With Taxes," NBER Working Papers 1271, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Phipps, Shelley, 1990. "Quantity-Constrainted Household Responses to UI Reform," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(399), pages 124-40, March.
  4. Janet Currie, 1993. "Welfare and the Well-Being of Children: The Relative Effectiveness of Cash and In-Kind Transfers," NBER Working Papers 4539, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Haddad, Lawrence & Hoddinott, John, 1994. "Women's income and boy-girl anthropometric status in the Cote d'Ivoire," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 543-553, April.
  6. Lundberg, S.J. & Pollak, R.A. & Wales, T.J., 1994. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from U.K. Child Benefit," Working Papers 94-6, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  7. Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1989. "A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--and Other Household Mysteries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1138-59, October.
  8. Kooreman, P. & Kapteyn, A.J., 1987. "A disaggregrated analysis of the allocation of time within the household," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-364357, Tilburg University.
  9. Woolley, Frances R, 1993. "The Feminist Challenge to Neoclassical Economics," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(4), pages 485-500, December.
  10. Thomas, D., 1989. "Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach," Papers 586, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  11. Schultz, T.P., 1990. "Testing The Neoclassical Model Of Family Labor Supply And Fertility," Papers 601, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  12. Hoddinott, John & Haddad, Lawrence, 1995. "Does Female Income Share Influence Household Expenditures? Evidence from Cote d'Ivoire," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 57(1), pages 77-96, February.
  13. Browning, Martin & Francois Bourguignon & Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Valerie Lechene, 1994. "Income and Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1067-96, December.
  14. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December.
  15. Fortin, B. & Lacroix, G., 1993. "A Test of the Neoclassical and Collective Models of Household Labour Supply," Papers 9335, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
  16. Shelley A. Phipps & Peter S. Burton, 1995. "Sharing within Families: Implications for the Measurement of Poverty among Individuals in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 177-204, February.
  17. Folbre, Nancy, 1986. "Cleaning house : New perspectives on Households and Economic Development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 5-40, June.
  18. Marjorie B. McElroy, 1990. "The Empirical Content of Nash-Bargained Household Behavior," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 559-583.
  19. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Frederic VERMEULEN, 2000. "Collective Household Models: Principles and Main Results," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0028, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
  2. Pierre Lefebvre & Philip Merrigan, 1998. "Family Background, Family Income, Maternal Work and Child Development," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 78, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
  3. Kristian Orsini & Amadéo Spadaro, 2006. "Strategic weight within couples: a microsimulation approach," Working Papers halshs-00590395, HAL.
  4. Urvashi Dhawan Biswal, 1999. "Testing the Family "Common Preference" Model for Immigrant and Non-Immigrant Women's Labour Supply," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 25(s1), pages 95-114, November.

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