The authors consider a noncooperative model of a family's time allocation between market work and providing a home-produced family public good (such as child care or care for the elderly). The model predicts underprovision of the public good. Because of crowding out, this does not necessarily warrant public provision. In contrast to other approaches in family economics, the authors find that attempts to redistribute between spouses may alter the final distribution within the marriage and that such a policy may be Pareto improving. They also find that some degree of progressivity of the income tax can be welfare improving. Copyright 1995 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Volume (Year): 97 (1995) Issue (Month): 4 (December) Pages: 581-601 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.) This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.