Matching and Sorting when Like Attracts Like
AbstractThis paper examines a class of two-sided matching problems with non-transferable utility. Agents are horizontally differentiated, and each would prefer to be matched to a similar partner, i.e. "like attracts like". such preferences imply a unique equilibrium assignment describing the pattern of matching; however, the pattern of assortment in equilibrium is found to depend critically on the distribution of types among the two sexes. Classification-JEL: C7
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh in its series ESE Discussion Papers with number 171.
Date of creation: 27 Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Matching; sorting; uniqueness; horizontal heterogeneity; marriage.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2007-10-06 (Game Theory)
- NEP-UPT-2007-10-06 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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