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Beauty is a Beast, Frog is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Patrick Legros (ECARES, Universite Libre de Bruxelles)
Andrew F. Newman () (Institute for Economic Development, Boston University)
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We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully transferable between partners. These conditions involve complementarity in types not only of the total payoff to a match, as in the transferable utility case, but also in the degree of transferability between partners. We apply our conditions to study some models of risk sharing and incentive problems, deriving new results for predicted matching patterns in those contexts
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Paper provided by Boston University - Department of Economics in its series Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series with number
dp-149.
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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: May 2002Date of revision:
Nov 2004Handle: RePEc:bos:iedwpr:dp-149Contact details of provider: Postal: 270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215 Phone: 617-353-4389 Fax: 617-353-444 Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Assortative matching ; nontransferable utility ; risk sharing ; interhousehold allocation. ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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