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Risk-Bearing and Entrepreneurship Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Andrew F. Newman () (Institute for Economic Development, Boston University)
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In the “Knightian” theory of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs provide insurance to workers by paying fixed wages and bear all the risk of production. This paper endogenizes entrepreneurial risk by allowing for optimal insurance contracts as well as the occupational selfselection. Moral hazard prevents full insurance; increases in an agent’s wealth then entail increases in risk borne. Thus, even under decreasing risk aversion, there are robust instances in which workers are wealthier than entrepreneurs. This empirically implausible result suggests that risk-based explanations for entrepreneurship are inadequate.
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Paper provided by Boston University - Department of Economics in its series Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series with number
dp-162.
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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2007Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bos:iedwpr:dp-162Contact details of provider: Postal: 270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215 Phone: 617-353-4389 Fax: 617-353-444 Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/ More information through EDIRC
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Kanbur, S M, 1979.
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Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
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[Downloadable!]
Mette Ejrnaes & Stefan Hochguertel, 2008.
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[Downloadable!]
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