This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Monotone Matching In Perfect And Imperfect Worlds

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Legros, Patrick
Newman, Andrew

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We study frictionless matching models in large production economies with and without market imperfections and/or incentive problems. We provide necessary and sufficient distribution-free conditions for monotone matching which depend on the relationship between what we call the segregation payoff - a generalization of the individually rational payoff - and the feasible set for a pair of types. Imperfections have two distinct effects that are relevant for equilibrium matching patterns: they can overwhelm the complementarity properties of the production technology and they can introduce nontransferabilities that make equilibrium matching inefficient. We also use our framework to reveal the source of differences in the comparative static properties of some models in the literature and to explore the effects of distribution on the equilibrium matching pattern.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP2396.asp
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2396.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Mar 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2396

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: Assortative Matching; Contracts; Imperfect Markets; Organizations;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1992. "Large Games and Economies With Effective Small Groups," Discussion Paper Serie B 215, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Aug 1992.
  2. Kremer, Michael, 1993. "The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(3), pages 551-75, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1986. "The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 105-137, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Kremer, M. & Maskin, E., 1995. "Segregation by Skill and the Rise in Inequality," Papers e-95-7, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
  5. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Robert Shimer & Lones Smith, 2000. "Assortative Matching and Search," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 343-370, March.
    Other versions:
  7. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-80, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Fernández, Raquel & Galí, Jordi, 1997. "To Each According To...? Markets, Tournaments, and the Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 1627, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew F., 1996. "Wealth Effects, Distribution, and the Theory of Organization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 312-341, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Benabou, Roland, 1996. "Equity and Efficiency in Human Capital Investment: The Local Connection," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 237-64, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Roland Benabou, 1991. "Workings of a City: Location, Education, and Production," NBER Technical Working Papers 0113, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Alessandra Casella & James E. Rauch, 1997. "Anonymous Market and Group Ties in International Trade," NBER Working Papers 6186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Sattinger, Michael, 1975. "Comparative Advantage and the Distributions of Earnings and Abilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 455-68, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Sattinger, Michael, 1993. "Assignment Models of the Distribution of Earnings," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(2), pages 831-80, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Gretsky, Neil E & Ostroy, Joseph M & Zame, William R, 1992. "The Nonatomic Assignment Model," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 103-27, January.
    Other versions:
  16. Kihlstrom, Richard E & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1979. "A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Theory of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(4), pages 719-48, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Aloysius Siow, 2009. "Testing Becker's Theory of Positive Assortative Matching," Working Papers tecipa-356, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ángel Gavilán, 2006. "Wage inequality, segregation by skill and the price of capital in an assignment model," Banco de España Working Papers 0613, Banco de España. [Downloadable!]
  3. Simon Clark, 2004. "Matching and Sorting with Horizontal Heterogeneity," ESE Discussion Papers 94, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  4. Gene Grossman, 2002. "The Distribution of Talent and the Pattern and Consequences of International Trade," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  5. Gene M. Grossman, 1999. "Imperfect Labor Contracts and International Trade," NBER Working Papers 6901, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2007. "Information Technology, Efficient Restructuring and the Productivity Puzzle," CEPR Discussion Papers 6109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Arnaud Costinot & Jonathan Vogel, 2009. "Matching and Inequality in the World Economy," NBER Working Papers 14672, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2005. "First in village or second in Rome?," Micro Theory Working Papers damiano-05-01-25-10-14-13, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 26 Jan 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. CITANNA, Alessandro & CHAKRABORTY, Archishman, 2002. "Occupational Choice, Incentives and Wealth Redistributions with Scarcity of Capital," Les Cahiers de Recherche 788, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
  10. Arnaud Costinot, 2007. "Heterogeneity and Trade," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2008-04, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
  11. CITANNA, Alessandro & CHAKRABORTY, Archishman, 2001. "Occupational Choice, incentives and wealth distribution," Les Cahiers de Recherche 720, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew, 2002. "Assortative Matching in a Non-transferable World," CEPR Discussion Papers 3469, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Luis Garicano & Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, 2005. "Organization and Inequality in a Knowledge Economy," NBER Working Papers 11458, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Authors can create their own profile with links to their works on the RePEc Author Service.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.