IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v88y2005i3p343-349.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Risk sharing vs. incentives: Contract design under two-sided heterogeneity

Author

Listed:
  • Serfes, Konstantinos

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Serfes, Konstantinos, 2005. "Risk sharing vs. incentives: Contract design under two-sided heterogeneity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 343-349, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:88:y:2005:i:3:p:343-349
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(05)00137-0
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert Shimer & Lones Smith, 2000. "Assortative Matching and Search," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 343-370, March.
    2. Kremer, M & Maskin, E, 1996. "Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill," Working papers 96-23, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    3. Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 2002. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 564-591, June.
    4. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    5. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2002. "Monotone Matching in Perfect and Imperfect Worlds," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(4), pages 925-942.
    6. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    7. Canice Prendergast, 2002. "The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 1071-1102, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2007. "Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1073-1102, July.
    2. Axel Anderson & Lones Smith, 2024. "The Comparative Statics of Sorting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(3), pages 709-751, March.
    3. Ueda, Masako & Li, Fei, 2005. "CEO-Firm Match and Principal-Agent Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 5119, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Chakraborty, Archishman & Citanna, Alessandro, 2005. "Occupational choice, incentives and wealth distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 206-224, June.
    5. Silvia Martinez-Gorricho & Miguel Sanchez Villalba, 2021. "Incentives, ability and disutility of effort," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 453-487, September.
    6. Maitreesh Ghatak & Alexander Karaivanov, 2011. "Contractual Structure and Endogenous Matching in Partnershipso," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 024, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    7. Ghatak, Maitreesh & Karaivanov, Alexander, 2014. "Contractual structure in agriculture with endogenous matching," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 239-249.
    8. Christina Håkanson & Erik Lindqvist & Jonas Vlachos, 2021. "Firms and Skills: The Evolution of Worker Sorting," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 56(2), pages 512-538.
    9. Ayça Kaya & Galina Vereshchagina, 2015. "Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(1), pages 73-121, September.
    10. Hector Chade & Jan Eeckhout & Lones Smith, 2017. "Sorting through Search and Matching Models in Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(2), pages 493-544, June.
    11. Lones Smith & Axel Anderson, 2002. "Assortative Matching, Reputation, and the Beatles Break-Up," Game Theory and Information 0201002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Arnaud Costinot & Jonathan Vogel, 2010. "Matching and Inequality in the World Economy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(4), pages 747-786, August.
    13. Bombardini, Matilde & Orefice, Gianluca & Tito, Maria D., 2019. "Does exporting improve matching? Evidence from French employer-employee data," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 229-241.
    14. McCann, Robert J. & Shi, Xianwen & Siow, Aloysius & Wolthoff, Ronald P., 2012. "Becker Meets Ricardo: Multisector Matching with Social and Cognitive Skills," IZA Discussion Papers 6533, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    15. Huffman, Wallace E & Just, Richard E, 2004. "Implications of Agency Theory for Optimal Land Tenure Contracts," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(3), pages 617-642, April.
    16. Aoyagi, Masaki & Yoo, Seung Han, 2022. "Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 271-296.
    17. Prasad, Kislaya & Salmon, Timothy C., 2013. "Self Selection and market power in risk sharing contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 71-86.
    18. Davidson, Carl & Heyman, Fredrik & Matusz, Steven & Sjöholm, Fredrik & Zhu, Susan Chun, 2014. "Globalization and imperfect labor market sorting," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 177-194.
    19. Arnaud Costinot, 2009. "An Elementary Theory of Comparative Advantage," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(4), pages 1165-1192, July.
    20. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2010. "First In Village Or Second In Rome?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(1), pages 263-288, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:88:y:2005:i:3:p:343-349. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.