Implications of Agency Theory for Optimal Land Tenure Contracts
AbstractExplores landowner-tenant contracts in land tenure in agriculture. Inefficiency of share tenancy relative to owner cultivation; Introduction of principal-agent models; Influence of monitoring in studying optimal landowner-tenant risk sharing; Need to study adequate tenant incentives
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 12337.
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economic Development and Cultural Change, April 2004, vol. 52, pp. 617-643
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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
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Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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Other versions of this item:
- Huffman, Wallace E & Just, Richard E, 2004. "Implications of Agency Theory for Optimal Land Tenure Contracts," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(3), pages 617-42, April.
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- Qiu, Feng & Goodwin, Barry K. & Gervais, Jean-Philippe, 2010. "An Empirical Investigation of the Linkages between Government Payments and Farmland Leasing Arrangements," 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 49242, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Yutaka Arimoto & Tetsuji Okazaki & Masaki Nakabayashi, 2005.
"Risk, Transaction Costs, and Geographic Distribution of Share Tenancy: A Case of Pre-War Japan,"
CARF-F-024, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Yutaka Arimoto & Tetsuji Okazaki & Masaki Nakabayashi, 2005. "Risk, Transaction Costs, and Geographic Distribution of Share Tenancy: A Case of Pre-War Japan," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-322, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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