First In Village Or Second In Rome?
AbstractThough individuals prefer high-quality peers, there are advantages to being high up in the pecking order within a group. In this environment, sorting of agents yields an overlapping interval structure in the type space. Segregation and mixing coexist in a stable equilibrium. With transfers, this equilibrium corresponds to a competitive equilibrium where agents bid for relative positions and entails less segregation than the efficient allocation. More egalitarianism within organizations induces greater segregation across organizations, but can improve the allocation efficiency. Since competition is most intense for intermediate talent, effective personnel policies differ systematically between high-quality and low-quality organizations. Copyright (2010) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 51 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
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Other versions of this item:
- Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2004. "First in Village or Second in Rome," Working Papers tecipa-221, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2005. "First in village or second in Rome?," Microeconomics.ca working papers damiano-05-01-25-10-14-13, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 26 Jan 2005.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - General
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