Formation of Convoys, Tennis Ladders, Colleges and Related Groups
AbstractWe analyze the formation of a hierarchy of groups such as herds, members of a "rung" in a tennis ladder, students at a particular quality of college, or club members sharing a local public good. An individual is interested in maximizing her individual payoff which depends on a variable associated with the group and a value associated with her rank within the group. We analyze equilibria, and the stability of the equilibrium set of groups, and welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 589.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 1985
Date of revision:
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- Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2005.
"First in village or second in Rome?,"
Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics
damiano-05-01-25-10-14-13, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 26 Jan 2005.
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