First in village or second in Rome?
AbstractThough individuals prefer to join groups with high quality peers, there are also advantages from being high up in the pecking order within a group. We show that sorting of agents in this environment results in an overlapping interval structure in the type space. Segregation and mixing coexist in a stable equilibrium. A greater degree of egalitarianism within organizations leads to greater segregation across organizations. Since competition is most intense for agents with intermediate talent, effective personnel policies to attract talent differ systematically between high-quality and low-quality organizations. When transfers are possible our stable equilibrium corresponds to a competitive equilibrium but entails too little segregation compared to the efficient assignment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Vancouver School of Economics in its series Microeconomics.ca working papers with number damiano-05-01-25-10-14-13.
Length: 0 pages
Date of creation: 25 Jan 2005
Date of revision: 26 Jan 2005
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Other versions of this item:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-02-01 (All new papers)
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