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First In Village Or Second In Rome?

Author

Listed:
  • Ettore Damiano
  • Hao Li
  • Wing Suen

Abstract

Though individuals prefer high-quality peers, there are advantages to being high up in the pecking order within a group. In this environment, sorting of agents yields an overlapping interval structure in the type space. Segregation and mixing coexist in a stable equilibrium. With transfers, this equilibrium corresponds to a competitive equilibrium where agents bid for relative positions and entails less segregation than the efficient allocation. More egalitarianism within organizations induces greater segregation across organizations, but can improve the allocation efficiency. Since competition is most intense for intermediate talent, effective personnel policies differ systematically between high-quality and low-quality organizations. Copyright (2010) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2010. "First In Village Or Second In Rome?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(1), pages 263-288, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:51:y:2010:i:1:p:263-288
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    Cited by:

    1. Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2012. "Competing for talents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2190-2219.
    2. Fernanda Estevan & Thomas Gall; Patrick Legros; Andrew F. Newman, 2014. "College Admission and High School Integration," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2014_26, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    3. Chade, Hector & Eeckhout, Jan, 2018. "Matching information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    4. Craig Andrea & Vierø Marie-Louise, 2013. "Academia or the Private Sector? Sorting of Agents into Institutions and an Outside Sector," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 303-345, December.
    5. John Morgan & Dana Sisak & Felix Várdy, 2018. "The Ponds Dilemma," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(611), pages 1634-1682, June.
    6. Linnemer, Laurent & Visser, Michael, 2016. "Self-selection in tournaments: The case of chess players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 213-234.
    7. Alison Watts, 2006. "Formation of Segregated and Integrated Groups," Working Papers 2006.127, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    8. Gusev, Vasily & Nesterov, Alexander & Reshetov, Mikhail & Suzdaltsev, Alex, 2024. "The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 38-51.
    9. Alison Watts, 2007. "Formation of segregated and integrated groups," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(4), pages 505-519, April.
    10. Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2016. "The Distribution of Talent across Contests Feedback in Higher Education," Working Papers 789, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    11. Morelli, Massimo & Park, In-Uck, 2016. "Internal hierarchy and stable coalition structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 90-96.
    12. Aner Sela & Ishay Rabi & Chen Cohen, 2023. "An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests," Working Papers 2317, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    13. Barberà, Salvador & Beviá, Carmen & Ponsatí, Clara, 2015. "Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 237-257.
    14. Tobias Hiller, 2022. "Abilities and the structure of the firm," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 69(3), pages 339-349, September.
    15. Jens Prüfer & Uwe Walz, 2013. "Academic faculty governance and recruitment decisions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 507-529, June.
    16. Khalil, Elias L. & Aimone, Jason A. & Houser, Daniel & Wang, Siyu & Martinez, Deborah & Qian, Kun, 2021. "The aspirational income hypothesis: On the limits of the relative income hypothesis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 229-247.
    17. Paweł Gola, 2024. "On the Importance of Social Status for Occupational Sorting," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(661), pages 2009-2040.
    18. Tim Ehlers & Robert Schwager, 2019. "Academic Achievement and Tracking - A Theory Based on Grading Standards," CESifo Working Paper Series 7866, CESifo.
    19. Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2018. "The Distribution of Talent Across Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(609), pages 471-509, March.
    20. Aner Sela & Ishay Rabi & Chen Cohen, 2024. "Reputation in Contests," Working Papers 2409, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    21. Tobias Hiller, 2023. "Training, Abilities and the Structure of Teams," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-8, May.
    22. Jambo, Siti Azmah & Abdulla, Rahmath & Mohd Azhar, Siti Hajar & Marbawi, Hartinie & Gansau, Jualang Azlan & Ravindra, Pogaku, 2016. "A review on third generation bioethanol feedstock," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 756-769.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General

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