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Competing for Talents

  • Damiano, Ettore
  • Li, Hao
  • Suen, Wing

Though individuals prefer to join groups with high quality peers, there are advantages to being high up in the pecking order within a group if higher ranked members of a group have greater access to the group's resources. When two organizations try to attract members from a ¯xed population of heterogeneous agents, how resources are distributed among the members according to their rank a®ects how agents choose between the organizations. Competition between the two organizations has implications for both the equilibrium sorting of agents and the way resources are distributed within each organization. To compete more intensely for the more talented agents, both organizations are selective and give no resources to their low ranks. In both organizations, higher ranks are rewarded with more resources, with a greater rate of increase in the organization that has a lower average quality in equilibrium.

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File URL: http://microeconomics.ca/ettore_damiano/adriano3.pdf
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Paper provided by Vancouver School of Economics in its series Microeconomics.ca working papers with number damiano-06-01-17-02-01-48.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 17 Jan 2006
Date of revision: 17 Jan 2006
Handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:damiano-06-01-17-02-01-48
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.economics.ubc.ca/

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  10. Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2005. "First in village or second in Rome?," Microeconomics.ca working papers damiano-05-01-25-10-14-13, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 26 Jan 2005.
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