Competing for Talents
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2006. "Competing for Talents," Departmental Working Papers _177, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics.
- Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2005. "Competing for Talents," Working Papers tecipa-220, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Espen R. Moen & Åsa Rosén, 2004. "Does Poaching Distort Training?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1143-1162.
- Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2003. "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 309-328, Summer.
- Bernhardt, Dan & Scoones, David, 1993. "Promotion, Turnover, and Preemptive Wage Offers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 771-791, September.
- Tranaes, Torben, 2001. "Raiding Opportunities and Unemployment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(4), pages 773-798, October.
- Edward P. Lazear, 2001. "Educational Production," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(3), pages 777-803.
- Postlewaite, Andrew, 1998.
"The social basis of interdependent preferences,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 779-800, May.
- Andrew Postlewaite, "undated". "The Social Basis of Interdependent Preferences," Penn CARESS Working Papers 6bd000503382ae2f0b90d25e3, Penn Economics Department.
- Andrew Postlewaite, "undated". ""The Social Basis of Interdependent Preferences''," CARESS Working Papres 97-14, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Cole, Harold L & Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1992. "Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1092-1125, December.
- Bruce Sacerdote, 2001.
"Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(2), pages 681-704.
- Bruce Sacerdote, 2000. "Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates," NBER Working Papers 7469, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2010.
"First In Village Or Second In Rome?,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(1), pages 263-288, February.
- Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2004. "First in Village or Second in Rome," Working Papers tecipa-221, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2005. "First in village or second in Rome?," Microeconomics.ca working papers damiano-05-01-25-10-14-13, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 26 Jan 2005.
- Edward P. Lazear, 1984. "Raids and Offermatching," NBER Working Papers 1419, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Summers, Anita A & Wolfe, Barbara L, 1977. "Do Schools Make a Difference?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(4), pages 639-652, September.
- de Bartolome, Charles A M, 1990. "Equilibrium and Inefficiency in a Community Model with Peer Group Effects," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 110-133, February.
- Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1998. "Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 33-62, March.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2019. "Quantity-cum-quality contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 289-297.
- Tomasz Kulisiewicz, 2013. "Redukcja obciążeń administracyjnych a wybrane zagadnienia informatyzacji administracji publicznej," Collegium of Economic Analysis Annals, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis, issue 29, pages 131-150.
- Chade, Hector & Eeckhout, Jan, 2018. "Matching information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
- Linnemer, Laurent & Visser, Michael, 2016.
"Self-selection in tournaments: The case of chess players,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 213-234.
- Laurent Linnemer & Michael Visser, 2016. "Self-selection in tournaments: The case of chess players," Post-Print hal-01629749, HAL.
- Puncheva-Michelotti, Petya & Hudson, Sarah & Jin, Gewen, 2018. "Employer branding and CSR communication in online recruitment advertising," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 643-651.
- Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2016. "The Distribution of Talent across Contests Feedback in Higher Education," Working Papers 789, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- John Morgan & Dana Sisak & Felix VÃ¡rdy, 2018. "The Ponds Dilemma," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(611), pages 1634-1682, June.
More about this item
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:damiano-06-01-17-02-01-48. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Maureen Chin). General contact details of provider: http://www.economics.ubc.ca/ .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.