IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ubc/pmicro/damiano-06-01-17-02-01-48.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Competing for Talents

Author

Listed:
  • Damiano, Ettore
  • Li, Hao
  • Suen, Wing

Abstract

Though individuals prefer to join groups with high quality peers, there are advantages to being high up in the pecking order within a group if higher ranked members of a group have greater access to the group's resources. When two organizations try to attract members from a ¯xed population of heterogeneous agents, how resources are distributed among the members according to their rank a®ects how agents choose between the organizations. Competition between the two organizations has implications for both the equilibrium sorting of agents and the way resources are distributed within each organization. To compete more intensely for the more talented agents, both organizations are selective and give no resources to their low ranks. In both organizations, higher ranks are rewarded with more resources, with a greater rate of increase in the organization that has a lower average quality in equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2006. "Competing for Talents," Microeconomics.ca working papers damiano-06-01-17-02-01-48, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 17 Jan 2006.
  • Handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:damiano-06-01-17-02-01-48
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://microeconomics.ca/ettore_damiano/adriano3.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Espen R. Moen & Åsa Rosén, 2004. "Does Poaching Distort Training?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1143-1162.
    2. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2003. "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 309-328, Summer.
    3. Bernhardt, Dan & Scoones, David, 1993. "Promotion, Turnover, and Preemptive Wage Offers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 771-791, September.
    4. Postlewaite, Andrew, 1998. "The social basis of interdependent preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 779-800, May.
    5. Edward P. Lazear, 1984. "Raids and Offermatching," NBER Working Papers 1419, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Summers, Anita A & Wolfe, Barbara L, 1977. "Do Schools Make a Difference?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(4), pages 639-652, September.
    7. de Bartolome, Charles A M, 1990. "Equilibrium and Inefficiency in a Community Model with Peer Group Effects," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 110-133, February.
    8. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1998. "Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 33-62, March.
    9. Tranaes, Torben, 2001. "Raiding Opportunities and Unemployment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(4), pages 773-798, October.
    10. Edward P. Lazear, 2001. "Educational Production," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(3), pages 777-803.
    11. Cole, Harold L & Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1992. "Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1092-1125, December.
    12. Bruce Sacerdote, 2001. "Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(2), pages 681-704.
    13. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2010. "First In Village Or Second In Rome?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(1), pages 263-288, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2019. "Quantity-cum-quality contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 289-297.
    2. Tomasz Kulisiewicz, 2013. "Redukcja obciążeń administracyjnych a wybrane zagadnienia informatyzacji administracji publicznej," Collegium of Economic Analysis Annals, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis, issue 29, pages 131-150.
    3. Chade, Hector & Eeckhout, Jan, 2018. "Matching information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    4. Linnemer, Laurent & Visser, Michael, 2016. "Self-selection in tournaments: The case of chess players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 213-234.
    5. Puncheva-Michelotti, Petya & Hudson, Sarah & Jin, Gewen, 2018. "Employer branding and CSR communication in online recruitment advertising," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 643-651.
    6. Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2016. "The Distribution of Talent across Contests Feedback in Higher Education," Working Papers 789, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    7. John Morgan & Dana Sisak & Felix Várdy, 2018. "The Ponds Dilemma," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(611), pages 1634-1682, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2010. "First In Village Or Second In Rome?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(1), pages 263-288, February.
    2. Jacob M. Markman & Eric A. Hanushek & John F. Kain & Steven G. Rivkin, 2003. "Does peer ability affect student achievement?," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(5), pages 527-544.
    3. Helmuth Cremer & Dario Maldonado, 2013. "Mixed oligopoly in education," Documentos de Trabajo 010500, Universidad del Rosario.
    4. Gordon Winston & David Zimmerman, 2004. "Peer Effects in Higher Education," NBER Chapters, in: College Choices: The Economics of Where to Go, When to Go, and How to Pay For It, pages 395-424, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Fernández, Raquel, 2001. "Sorting, Education and Inequality," CEPR Discussion Papers 3020, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Epple, Dennis & Figlio, David & Romano, Richard, 2004. "Competition between private and public schools: testing stratification and pricing predictions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1215-1245, July.
    7. Kang, Changhui, 2007. "Classroom peer effects and academic achievement: Quasi-randomization evidence from South Korea," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 458-495, May.
    8. Marisa Hidalgo, 2005. "Peer Group Effects And Optimal Education System," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-12, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    9. Thomas J. Nechyba, 1999. "A Model of Multiple Districts and Private Schools: The Role of Mobility, Targeting, and Private School Vouchers," NBER Working Papers 7239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Renato Gomes & Alessandro Pavan, 2013. "Cross-Subsidization and Matching Design," Discussion Papers 1559, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    11. Board, Simon, 2009. "Monopolistic group design with peer effects," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 4(1), March.
    12. Dennis N. Epple & Richard Romano, 2003. "Neighborhood Schools, Choice, and the Distribution of Educational Benefits," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of School Choice, pages 227-286, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Adnett, Nick & Bougheas, Spiros & Davies, Peter, 2002. "Market-based reforms of public schooling: some unpleasant dynamics," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 323-330, August.
    14. Selod, Harris & Zenou, Yves, 2003. "Private versus public schools in post-Apartheid South African cities: theory and policy implications," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 351-394, August.
    15. Calabrese, Stephen & Epple, Dennis & Romer, Thomas & Sieg, Holger, 2006. "Local public good provision: Voting, peer effects, and mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 959-981, August.
    16. Gomes, Renato & Pavan, Alessandro, 2016. "Many-to-many matching and price discrimination," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), September.
    17. De Fraja, Gianni & Martínez-Mora, Francisco, 2014. "The desegregating effect of school tracking," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 164-177.
    18. Raquel Fernandez, 2001. "Sorting, Education and Inequality," NBER Working Papers 8101, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. De Fraja, Gianni & Landeras, Pedro, 2006. "Could do better: The effectiveness of incentives and competition in schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 189-213, January.
    20. Michael Kremer & Dan Levy, 2008. "Peer Effects and Alcohol Use among College Students," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(3), pages 189-206, Summer.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:damiano-06-01-17-02-01-48. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: http://www.economics.ubc.ca/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Maureen Chin (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.economics.ubc.ca/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.