Raids and Offermatching
Job changes often occur without spells of unemployment. Highly educated workers, for example, rarely suffer unemployment, even though job changes are common. A large proportion of their job switches occur only after the new job is secured. These workers, whose skills and ability levels are less homogeneous, differ from less skilled, perhaps more homogeneous workers who are more likely to experience unemployment in the process of changing jobs. Most research has focused on job changes that imply spells of unemployment. Indeed, the primary rationale behind the earliest papers on search theory was to explain unemployment. But if there exists what some refer to as a "dual labor market," these theories may be most applicable to the secondary workers. This paper attempts to formulate a theory of turnover and wage dynamics that may better describe the primary labor force, defined as those who change jobs without unemployment. In the process, a number of previously unexamined phenomena are explored.
|Date of creation:||Aug 1984|
|Publication status:||published as Lazear, Edward P. "Raids and Offer-Matching," Research in Labor Economics,ed. Ronald Ehrenberg, Vol. 8, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT. pp. 141-165, 1986|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
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- Flinn, Christopher J & Heckman, James J, 1983.
"Are Unemployment and Out of the Labor Force Behaviorally Distinct Labor Force States?,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(1), pages 28-42, January.
- Christopher J. Flinn & James J. Heckman, 1982. "Are Unemployment and Out of the Labor Force Behaviorally Distinct Labor Force States?," NBER Working Papers 0979, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
- John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 152, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
- J. Riley & E. Maskin, 1981. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Working papers 311, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 315-333. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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