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Raids and Offermatching

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  • Edward P. Lazear

Abstract

Job changes often occur without spells of unemployment. Highly educated workers, for example, rarely suffer unemployment, even though job changes are common. A large proportion of their job switches occur only after the new job is secured. These workers, whose skills and ability levels are less homogeneous, differ from less skilled, perhaps more homogeneous workers who are more likely to experience unemployment in the process of changing jobs. Most research has focused on job changes that imply spells of unemployment. Indeed, the primary rationale behind the earliest papers on search theory was to explain unemployment. But if there exists what some refer to as a "dual labor market," these theories may be most applicable to the secondary workers. This paper attempts to formulate a theory of turnover and wage dynamics that may better describe the primary labor force, defined as those who change jobs without unemployment. In the process, a number of previously unexamined phenomena are explored.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward P. Lazear, 1984. "Raids and Offermatching," NBER Working Papers 1419, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1419
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Flinn, Christopher J & Heckman, James J, 1983. "Are Unemployment and Out of the Labor Force Behaviorally Distinct Labor Force States?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(1), pages 28-42, January.
    2. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    3. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
    4. Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 315-333.
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    Cited by:

    1. Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2012. "Competing for talents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2190-2219.
    2. Lazear, Edward, 2003. "The Peter Principle: A Theory of Decline," IZA Discussion Papers 759, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    3. Gibbons, Robert & Katz, Lawrence F, 1991. "Layoffs and Lemons," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(4), pages 351-380, October.
    4. Carolyn Pitchik, 2008. "Self-Promoting Investments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(3), pages 381-406, September.
    5. Waldman, Michael, 1990. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(2), pages 230-250, April.
    6. Caparros, A. & Navarro, M.L., 2005. "Factors Affecting Quits and Layoffs in Spanish Labour Market," Applied Econometrics and International Development, Euro-American Association of Economic Development, vol. 5(4).
    7. Pekka Ilmakunnas & Mika Maliranta, 2005. "Worker inflow, outflow, and churning," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(10), pages 1115-1133.
    8. Koch, Alexander K. & Peyrache, Eloic, 2005. "Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns," IZA Discussion Papers 1841, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    9. Antonio Caparrós Ruiz & Mª. Lucía Navarro Gómez, 2002. "Factors affecting quits and layoffs in Spain," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2002/16, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
    10. Gielen, A. C. & van Ours, J.C., 2006. "Why do Worker-Firm Matches Dissolve?," Discussion Paper 2006-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    11. Joseph G. Altonji & Charles R. Pierret, "undated". "Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination," IPR working papers 97-18, Institute for Policy Resarch at Northwestern University.
    12. Catherine C. de Fontenay & Joshua S. Gans, 2003. "Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intrafirm Bargaining: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 448-455, March.
    13. Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2011. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 655-688.
    14. Joshua C. Pinkston, 2009. "A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 367-394.
    15. Davia, Maria A., 2005. "Job mobility and wage mobility at the beginning of the working career: a comparative view across Europe," ISER Working Paper Series 2005-03, Institute for Social and Economic Research.

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