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Turnover wages and adverse selection

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  • Charles T. Carlstrom

Abstract

An explanation of the observed relationships between voluntary job turnover and wages over a worker's lifetime, using a model featuring adverse selection.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles T. Carlstrom, 1987. "Turnover wages and adverse selection," Working Papers (Old Series) 8717, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:8717
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    1. Ann P. Bartel & George J. Borjas, 1981. "Wage Growth and Job Turnover: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in Labor Markets, pages 65-90, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Riley, John G., 1975. "Competitive signalling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 174-186, April.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1962. "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," NBER Chapters, in: Investment in Human Beings, pages 9-49, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Richard B. Freeman & David A. Wise, 1982. "The Youth Labor Market Problem: Its Nature Causes and Consequences," NBER Chapters, in: The Youth Labor Market Problem: Its Nature, Causes, and Consequences, pages 1-16, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1979. "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 972-990, October.
    6. Feldstein, Martin S, 1976. "Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 937-957, October.
    7. Gottschalk, Peter & Maloney, Tim, 1985. "Involuntary Terminations, Unemployment, and Job Matching: A Test of Job Search Theory," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(2), pages 109-123, April.
    8. MacDonald, Glenn M, 1982. "A Market Equilibrium Theory of Job Assignment and Sequential Accumulation of Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1038-1055, December.
    9. Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1981. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," Discussion Papers 488, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Joanne Salop & Steven Salop, 1976. "Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 619-627.
    11. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    12. Linda Leighton & Jacob Mincer, 1982. "Labor Turnover and Youth Unemployment," NBER Chapters, in: The Youth Labor Market Problem: Its Nature, Causes, and Consequences, pages 235-276, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Freeman, Richard B. & Wise, David A. (ed.), 1982. "The Youth Labor Market Problem," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226261614, December.
    14. Bruce C. Greenwald, 1986. "Adverse Selection in the Labour Market," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 325-347.
    15. Joanne Salop & Steven C. Salop, 1976. "Self-selection and turnover in the labor market," Special Studies Papers 80, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    16. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
    17. Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 315-333.
    18. Walter Y. Oi, 1962. "Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 538-538.
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    Keywords

    Labor market; Wages;

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