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Turnover, wages, and adverse selection

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  • Charles T. Carlstrom

Abstract

An argument that adverse selection in the labor market can explain why frequent job-changers have lower average wages and flatter age-earnings profiles than workers who change jobs infrequently. Adverse selection also provides a basis for examining the welfare implications of low-productivity workers in the labor market.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles T. Carlstrom, 1989. "Turnover, wages, and adverse selection," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, vol. 25(Q I), pages 18-28.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcer:y:1989:i:qi:p:18-28:n:v.25no.1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ann P. Bartel & George J. Borjas, 1981. "Wage Growth and Job Turnover: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in Labor Markets, pages 65-90, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    5. Bruce C. Greenwald, 1986. "Adverse Selection in the Labour Market," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 325-347.
    6. Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 315-333.
    7. Riley, John G., 1975. "Competitive signalling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 174-186, April.
    8. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1979. "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 972-990, October.
    9. Feldstein, Martin S, 1976. "Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 937-957, October.
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    12. Joanne Salop & Steven Salop, 1976. "Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 619-627.
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