Formation of Convoys, Tennis Ladders, Colleges and Related Groups
We analyze the formation of a hierarchy of groups such as herds, members of a "rung" in a tennis ladder, students at a particular quality of college, or club members sharing a local public good. An individual is interested in maximizing her individual payoff which depends on a variable associated with the group and a value associated with her rank within the group. We analyze equilibria, and the stability of the equilibrium set of groups, and welfare.
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|Date of creation:||1985|
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