First in Village or Second in Rome
AbstractThough individuals prefer to join groups with high quality peers, there are also advantages from being high up in the pecking order within the group. We show that sorting of agents in this environment results in an overlapping interval structure in the type space. Segregation and mixing coexist in a stable equilibrium. A greater degree of egalitarianism within organizations leads to greater segregation across organizations. Policies that are effective for lower-quality organizations to attract talent may be counterproductive for higher-quality organizations to retain talent. The degree and the pattern of segregation are shown to depend also on whether higher types are less concerned with relative ranking within the organization, on relative size of organizations, and on the extent of idiosyncratic preferences for other organizational attributes.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number tecipa-221.
Date of creation: 11 Sep 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario
Phone: (416) 978-5283
Other versions of this item:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-04-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-SOC-2006-04-08 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-URE-2006-04-08 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew, 2000.
"Monotone Matching In Perfect And Imperfect Worlds,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2396, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2002. "Monotone Matching in Perfect and Imperfect Worlds," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 925-942.
- Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew F, 2002. "Monotone Matching in Perfect and Imperfect Worlds," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(4), pages 925-42, October.
- Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1998. "Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 33-62, March.
- Kremer, Michael, 1993. "The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(3), pages 551-75, August.
- Andrew Postlewaite, .
""The Social Basis of Interdependent Preferences'',"
CARESS Working Papres
97-14, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- de Bartolome, Charles A M, 1990. "Equilibrium and Inefficiency in a Community Model with Peer Group Effects," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 110-33, February.
- Bruce Sacerdote, 2001.
"Peer Effects With Random Assignment: Results For Dartmouth Roommates,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 116(2), pages 681-704, May.
- Bruce Sacerdote, 2000. "Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates," NBER Working Papers 7469, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael Kremer & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Wage Inequality and Segregation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1777, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- J. Solnick, Sara & Hemenway, David, 1998. "Is more always better?: A survey on positional concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 373-383, November.
- Arnott, Richard & Rowse, John, 1987.
"Peer group effects and educational attainment,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 287-305, April.
- Edward P. Lazear, 1999.
NBER Working Papers
7349, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael Kremer & Eric Maskin, 1996.
"Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill,"
NBER Working Papers
5718, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug..
- Summers, Anita A & Wolfe, Barbara L, 1977. "Do Schools Make a Difference?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(4), pages 639-52, September.
- Cole, Harold L & Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1992. "Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1092-1125, December.
- Susan Athey & Christopher Avery & Peter Zemsky, 1998.
"Mentoring and Diversity,"
NBER Working Papers
6496, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John Hartwick & Yoshitsugu Kanemoto, 1985. "Formation of Convoys, Tennis Ladders, Colleges and Related Groups," Working Papers 589, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Fernandez, Raquel & Rogerson, Richard, 1996. "Income Distribution, Communities, and the Quality of Public Education," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 135-64, February.
- Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2005.
"Competing for Talents,"
tecipa-220, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2006. "Competing for Talents," Departmental Working Papers _177, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics.
- Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2006. "Competing for Talents," Microeconomics.ca working papers damiano-06-01-17-02-01-48, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 17 Jan 2006.
- Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2012.
"The Distribution of Talent across Contests,"
600, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Prüfer, J. & Walz, U., 2009.
"Academic Faculty Governance and Recruitment Decisions,"
2009-021, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Jens Prüfer & Uwe Walz, 2013. "Academic faculty governance and recruitment decisions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 507-529, June.
- Prüfer, J. & Walz, U., 2013. "Academic faculty governance and recruitment decisions," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-5117896, Tilburg University.
- Alison Watts, 2007. "Formation of segregated and integrated groups," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 505-519, April.
- Craig Andrea & Vierø Marie-Louise, 2013.
"Academia or the Private Sector? Sorting of Agents into Institutions and an Outside Sector,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics,
De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 303-345, December.
- Andrea Craig & Marie-Louise VierÃ¸, 2008. "Academia or the Private Sector? Sorting of Agents into Institutions and an Outside Sector," Working Papers 1198, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Alison Watts, 2006. "Formation of Segregated and Integrated Groups," Working Papers 2006.127, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Salvador Barberà & Carmen Beviá & Clara Ponsatí, 2014. "Meritocracy, Egalitarianism and the Stability of Majoritarian Organizations," Working Papers 737, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (RePEc Maintainer).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.