Implications of Agency Theory for Optimal Land Tenure Contracts
AbstractExplores landowner-tenant contracts in land tenure in agriculture. Inefficiency of share tenancy relative to owner cultivation; Introduction of principal-agent models; Influence of monitoring in studying optimal landowner-tenant risk sharing; Need to study adequate tenant incentives
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Economic Development and Cultural Change.
Volume (Year): 52 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/EDCC/
Other versions of this item:
- Huffman, Wallace & Just, Richard E., 2004. "Implications of Agency Theory for Optimal Land Tenure Contracts," Staff General Research Papers 12337, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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- Qiu, Feng & Goodwin, Barry K. & Gervais, Jean-Philippe, 2010. "An Empirical Investigation of the Linkages between Government Payments and Farmland Leasing Arrangements," 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 49242, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
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