References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-28, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 742, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
2. Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, 1993. "Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 78-100, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Radner, Roy, 1985. "Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1173-98, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Sugato Bhattacharyya & Francine Lafontaine, 1995. "Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 761-781, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Pierre Dubois, 2000. "Consumption Insurance with Heterogeneous Preferences. Can Sharecropping Help Complete Markets?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1597, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Dubois, P., 2001. "Consumption insurance with heterogeneous preferences. Can sharecropping help complete markets ?," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 25, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse). [Downloadable!]
7. Stiglitz, J.E., 1988. "Sharecropping," Papers 11, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
8. Hoffman, Philip T., 1984. "The Economic Theory of Sharecropping in Early Modern France," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(02), pages 309-319, June. [Downloadable!]
9. Radner, Roy, 1981. "Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(5), pages 1127-48, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Shaban, Radwan Ali, 1987. "Testing between Competing Models of Sharecropping," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 893-920, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Jacoby, Hanan G. & Mansuri, Ghazala, 2006. "Incomplete contracts and investment : a study of land tenancy in Pakistan," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3826, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
12. Alston, Lee J & Datta, Samar K & Nugent, Jeffrey B, 1984. "Tenancy Choice in a Competitive Framework with Transactions Costs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 1121-33, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Eswaran, Mukesh & Kotwal, Ashok, 1985. "A Theory of Contractual Structure in Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 352-67, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Richard A. Lambert, 1983. "Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 441-452, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "Repeated Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 69-76, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
17. Chaudhuri, Ananish & Maitra, Pushkar, 2002. "On the Choice of Tenancy Contracts in Rural India," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 69(275), pages 445-59, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Manyong, Victor M. & Houndékon, Victorin A., 2000. "Land tenurial systems and the adoption of Mucuna planted fallow in the derived savannas of West Africa:," CAPRi working papers 4, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). [Downloadable!]
19. D. Gale Johnson, 1950. "Resource Allocation under Share Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 111. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Rubinstein, Ariel & Yaari, Menahem E., 1983. "Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 74-97, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Besley, Timothy, 1995. "Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 903-37, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Green, Jerry R & Stokey, Nancy L, 1983. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 349-64, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Jerry R. Green & Nancy L. Stokey, 1982. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, . "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 15-80, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
24. Banerjee, Abhijit V. & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2004. "Eviction threats and investment incentives," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 469-488, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
25. Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 2002. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 564-591, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 1999. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 92, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
    • Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 1999. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Papers 0096, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
    • Ackerberg, D.A. & Botticini, M., 1999. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Papers 96, Boston University - Department of Economics.
26. Allen, Douglas & Lueck, Dean, 1992. "Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent versus Cropshare," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 397-426, October.
27. Ray, Tridip, 1999. "Share tenancy as strategic delegation," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 45-60, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
28. Allen, Douglas W & Lueck, Dean, 1999. "The Role of Risk in Contract Choice," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 704-36, October.
29. Hanan G. Jacoby & Guo Li & Scott Rozelle, 2002. "Hazards of Expropriation: Tenure Insecurity and Investment in Rural China," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1420-1447, December. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Jacoby, Hanan G. & Li, Guo & Rozelle, Scott, 2002. "Hazards Of Expropriation:Tenure Insecurity And Investment In Rural China," Working Papers 11960, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
30. Oriana Bandiera, 2007. "Contract Duration and Investment Incentives: Evidence from Land Tenancy Agreements," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(5), pages 953-986, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
31. Binswanger, Hans P. & Deininger, Klaus & Feder, Gershon, 1993. "Power, distortions, revolt, and reform in agricultural land relations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1164, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Binswanger, Hans P. & Deininger, Klaus & Feder, Gershon, 1995. "Power, distortions, revolt and reform in agricultural land relations," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Hollis Chenery† & T.N. Srinivasan (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 42, pages 2659-2772 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
32. Otsuka, Keijiro & Hayami, Yujiro, 1988. "Theories of Share Tenancy: A Critical Survey," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 31-68, October.
33. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
34. Dubois, Pierre, 2002. "Moral hazard, land fertility and sharecropping in a rural area of the Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 35-64, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Pierre Dubois, . "Moral Hazard, Land Fertility and Sharecropping in a Rural Area of the Philippines," Working Papers 99-30, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique. [Downloadable!]
35. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)