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Incentives, supervision, and sharecropper productivity

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  • Jacoby, Hanan G.
  • Mansuri, Ghazala

Abstract

Though sharecropping remains widespread, its determinants are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. We address both issues by analyzing the role of landlord supervision. When landlords vary in their cost of supervision, otherwise identical share-tenants can have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from share-tenants in rural Pakistan confirms that, controlling for selection, 'supervised' tenants are significantly more productive than 'unsupervised' ones. Also, landlords' decisions regarding monitoring and incentives offered to tenants depend importantly on the cost of supervision.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 88 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 232-241

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Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:88:y:2009:i:2:p:232-241

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec

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Keywords: Incentives Contracts Supervision Sharecropping;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Ghebru, Hosaena H. & Holden, Stein T., 2012. "Reverse-Share-Tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency: Bargaining Power of Landowners and the Sharecropper’s Productivity," 2012 Conference, August 18-24, 2012, Foz do Iguacu, Brazil, International Association of Agricultural Economists 126883, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
  2. Douglas Gollin, 2012. "The Agricultural Productivity Gap in Developing Countries," 2012 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 510, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. Deininger, Klaus & Ali, Daniel Ayalew & Alemu, Tekie, 2011. "Productivity effects of land rental markets in Ethiopia : Evidence from a matched tenant-landlord sample," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5727, The World Bank.
  4. Jin, Songqing & Deininger, Klaus, 2009. "Land rental markets in the process of rural structural transformation: Productivity and equity impacts from China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 629-646, December.
  5. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing & Yadav, Vandana, 2012. "Does sharecropping affect productivity and long-term investment ? evidence from West Bengal's tenancy reforms," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6293, The World Bank.
  6. Abdulai, Awudu & Owusu, Victor & Goetz, Renan, 2011. "Land tenure differences and investment in land improvement measures: Theoretical and empirical analyses," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 66-78, September.
  7. Douglas Gollin & David Lagakos & Michael E. Waugh, 2013. "The Agricultural Productivity Gap," NBER Working Papers 19628, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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