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Monitoring and Pay

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Author Info
Allgulin, Magnus (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)
Ellingsen, Tore () (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

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Abstract

The shirking model of efficiency wages has been thought to imply that monitoring and pay are substitute instruments for motivating workers. We demonstrate that this result hinges critically on restrictive assumptions regarding workers' choice of effort - for example that there are only two possible effort levels. Under more reasonable assumptions, monitoring and pay are complementary instruments. Another result is that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the wage level and the workers' rents. Finally, much of the empirical literature on the monitoring-pay relationship is shown to be seriously misguided.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 245.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 16 Jun 1998
Date of revision: 22 Nov 1999
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0245

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Related research
Keywords: Monitoring; efficiency wages; incentive pay.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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  1. Dennis Dittrich & Martin Kocher, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-23, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Sarah Brown & Robert McNabb & Karl Taylor, 2006. "Firm Performance, Worker Commitment and Loyalty," Working Papers 2006005, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2006. [Downloadable!]
  3. Sarah Brown & Fathi Fakhfakh & John G. Sessions, . "Wages, Supervision and Sharing," Discussion Papers in Public Sector Economics 00/4, Department of Economics, University of Leicester. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Ross, Stephen L. & Zenou, Yves, 2008. "Are Shirking and Leisure Substitutable? An Empirical Test of Efficiency Wages based on Urban Economic Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 6841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Nikolaos Theodoropoulos & John G. Sessions, 2009. "Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 5-2009, University of Cyprus Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Pablo González, 2002. "Profit Sharing Reconsidered: Efficiency Wages and Renegotiation Costs," Documentos de Trabajo 151, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
  7. Dittrich, Dennis & Kocher, Martin, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee under Endogenous Supervision," CEPR Discussion Papers 5962, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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