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Contractual Mix in Southern Agriculture since the Civil War: Facts, Hypotheses, and Tests

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Author Info
Alston, Lee J.
Higgs, Robert

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Abstract

In the South after 1865, workers and property owners employed a variety of contracts to bring together cooperating resources in agricultural production. The contractual mix varied over time and space, depending on the relative resource endowments of the contracting parties, the prevailing risk conditions, and the transactions costs of alternative contractual arrangements. To understand the contractual mix, certain empirical distinctions must be made, and the major hypotheses advanced to explain the mix must be seen as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. These hypotheses, however, differ in their demonstrated ability to account for the empirical variance. In addition to factual clarification and theoretical explication, the paper presents a new sample of plantation data and a new econometric procedure for performing more detailed and better controlled tests of hypotheses.

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File URL: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022050700027467
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal The Journal of Economic History.

Volume (Year): 42 (1982)
Issue (Month): 02 (June)
Pages: 327-353
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Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:42:y:1982:i:02:p:327-353_02

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  1. Oriana Bandiera, 1999. "On the Structure of Tenancy contracts: Theory and Evidence fron 19th Century Rural Sicily," STICERD - Development Economics Papers 19, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Benito Arruñada & Manuel González, 1997. "How Competition Controls Team Production: The Case of Fishing Firms," Economics Working Papers 261, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  3. Suresh Naidu, 2008. "Recruitment Restrictions and labor markets: evidence from the post-bellum U.S. south," Working Papers 1114, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
  4. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 6695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Vital Anderhub & Simon Gächter & Manfred Königstein, 2002. "Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 5-27, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Oyer, Paul, 2001. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?," Research Papers 1686, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Gibbons, Robert, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 115-32, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Lee J. Alston & Joseph P. Ferrie, 2005. "Time on the Ladder: Career Mobility in Agriculture, 1890-1938," NBER Working Papers 11231, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Ramona Frunza & Marian Stanciu, 2007. "The institutional change and it´s implications on economic development," Romanian Economic Business Review, Romanian-American University, vol. 2(1), pages 71-78, March. [Downloadable!]
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