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The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard, or Capital Market Imperfections?

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  • Ackerberg, Daniel A.
  • Botticini, Maristella

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Explorations in Economic History.

Volume (Year): 37 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 241-257

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Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:37:y:2000:i:3:p:241-257

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622830

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References

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  1. Allen, Douglas W & Lueck, Dean, 1995. "Risk Preferences and the Economics of Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 447-51, May.
  2. Pudney, Stephen & Galassi, Francesco L & Mealli, Fabrizia, 1998. "An Econometric Model of Farm Tenures in Fifteenth-Century Florence," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(260), pages 535-56, November.
  3. Allen, Douglas W & Lueck, Dean, 1999. "The Role of Risk in Contract Choice," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 704-36, October.
  4. Reid, Joseph D, Jr, 1976. " Sharecropping and Agricultural Uncertainty," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 549-76, April.
  5. Braverman, Avishay & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1982. "Sharecropping and the Interlinking of Agrarian Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 695-715, September.
  6. Luporini, Annalisa & Parigi, Bruno, 1996. "Multi-Task Sharecropping Contracts: The Italian Mezzadria," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 63(251), pages 445-57, August.
  7. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1973. "Incentives and Risk-Sharing in Sharecropping," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 353, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Matoussi, Mohamed Salah., 1988. "Moral Hazard, Financial Constraints and Sharecropping in El Oulja," Working Papers 667, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  9. Shaban, Radwan Ali, 1987. "Testing between Competing Models of Sharecropping," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 893-920, October.
  10. Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  11. Kauffman Kyle D., 1993. "Why Was the Mule Used in Southern Agriculture? Empirical Evidence of Principal-Agent Solutions," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 336-351, July.
  12. Higgs, Robert, 1974. "Patterns of Farm Rental in the Georgia Cotton Belt, 1880–1900," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(02), pages 468-482, June.
  13. Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, 1993. "Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 78-100, Spring.
  14. Eswaran, Mukesh & Kotwal, Ashok, 1985. "A Theory of Contractual Structure in Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 352-67, June.
  15. Rao, C H Hanumantha, 1971. "Uncertainty, Entrepreneurship, and Sharecropping in India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(3), pages 578-95, May-June.
  16. Alston, Lee J. & Kauffman, Kyle D., 1997. "Agricultural Chutes and Ladders: New Estimates of Sharecroppers and “True Tenants” in the South, 1900–1920," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(02), pages 464-475, June.
  17. Botticini, Maristella, 2000. "A Tale of Governments: Private Credit Markets, Public Finance, and the Role of Jewish Lenders in Medieval and Renaissance Italy," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(01), pages 164-189, March.
  18. Alston, Lee J & Datta, Samar K & Nugent, Jeffrey B, 1984. "Tenancy Choice in a Competitive Framework with Transactions Costs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 1121-33, December.
  19. Hoffman, Philip T., 1984. "The Economic Theory of Sharecropping in Early Modern France," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(02), pages 309-319, June.
  20. Alston, Lee J. & Higgs, Robert, 1982. "Contractual Mix in Southern Agriculture since the Civil War: Facts, Hypotheses, and Tests," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(02), pages 327-353, June.
  21. Higgs, Robert, 1973. "Race, Tenure, and Resource Allocation in Southern Agriculture, 1910," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(01), pages 149-169, March.
  22. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September.
  23. Otsuka, Keijiro & Chuma, Hiroyuki & Hayami, Yujiro, 1992. "Land and Labor Contracts in Agrarian Economies: Theories and Facts," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1965-2018, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Luis H. B. Braido, 2003. "Insurance and Incentives in Sharecropping," CESifo Working Paper Series 1098, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Roy, Jaideep & Serfes, Konstantinos, 2001. "Intertemporal discounting and tenurial contracts," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 417-436, April.
  3. Joram Mayshar & Omer Moav & Zvika Neeman, 2011. "Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State," Working Papers 002-11, International School of Economics at TSU, Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia.
  4. David R Stead, . "Fixed Rent Contracts in English Agriculture, 1750-1850: A Conjecture," Discussion Papers 05/01, Department of Economics, University of York.
  5. Pierre Dubois, 1999. "Moral Hazard, Land Fertility and Sharecropping in a Rural Area of the Philippines," Working Papers 99-30, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.

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