Why Was the Mule Used in Southern Agriculture? Empirical Evidence of Principal-Agent Solutions
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Explorations in Economic History.
Volume (Year): 30 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622830
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- Alston, Lee J. & Kauffman, Kyle D., 2001. "Competition and the Compensation of Sharecroppers by Race: A View from Plantations in the Early Twentieth Century," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 181-194, January.
- Ackerberg, Daniel A. & Botticini, Maristella, 2000. "The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard, or Capital Market Imperfections?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 241-257, July.
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