An Econometric Model of Farm Tenures in Fifteenth-Century Florence
AbstractThe authors estimate a discrete-choice model of farm tenures in fifteenth-century Florence using data in the form of an unbalanced panel, with individual farms nested within landlords' total property holdings. The probabilities of wage, rental, and sharecropping tenures are estimated, allowing for landlord-specific random effects. Specification tests are used to validate the model. The authors' results emphasize the role of long-lived fixed assets (vines), vulnerable to damage by short-term over-production, as a factor favoring sharecropping (which 'taxes' overproduction). However, they find evidence against theories emphasizing high monitoring costs as an influence favoring rental contracts. Copyright 1998 by The London School of Economics and Political Science
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 65 (1998)
Issue (Month): 260 (November)
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