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Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts

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Author Info
Douglas W. Allen
Dean Lueck

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Abstract

Modern cropshare contracts are explained using a model in which agents are risk neutral and contract rules are chosen to maximize expected joint wealth. It is shown that the farmer either bears the entire cost of inputs or shares the costs with the landowner in the same proportion as the output. The incentives of altering the cropshare percentage are examined and are used to derive implications about the portion of the crop that will be owned by the farmer. The model is tested and supported using data from a 1986 survey of farmers and landowners in Nebraska and South Dakota.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 24 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 78-100
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:24:y:1993:i:spring:p:78-100

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  1. Bierlen, Ralph & Parsch, Lucas D. & Dixon, Bruce L., 1999. "How Cropland Contract Type And Term Decisions Are Made: Evidence From An Arkansas Tenant Survey," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA), vol. 2(01). [Downloadable!]
  2. Benito Arruñada & Manuel González, 1997. "How Competition Controls Team Production: The Case of Fishing Firms," Economics Working Papers 261, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  3. Paudel, Krishna P. & Lohr, Luanne & Martin, Neil R., Jr., 2000. "Effect Of Risk Perspective On Fertilizer Choice By Sharecroppers," Series Reports 23814, Auburn University, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology. [Downloadable!]
  4. Moss, Leeann E. & Barry, Peter J. & Schnitkey, Gary D. & Westgren, Randall E., 2001. "A Transaction Cost Economics And Property Rights Theory Approach To Farmland Lease Preferences," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20537, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  5. Wang, Chia-Hsing & Roe, Brian, 2002. "Deriving Feeder Cattle Pricing Contracts From Fed Cattle Price Grids: Simulation Results Of Risk-Sharing Contracts," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19755, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  6. Luis H. B. Braido, 2003. "Insurance and Incentives in Sharecropping," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  7. Metin M. Cosgel & Thomas J. Miceli, 2007. "Tax Collection in History," Working papers 2007-48, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2008. [Downloadable!]
  8. Radkevitch, U.L. & Heck, H.W.G.M. van & Koppius, O.R., 2008. "Choosing between Auctions and Negotiations in Online B2B Markets for IT Services: The Effect of Prior Relationships and Performance," Research Paper ERS-2008-004-LIS Revision, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus Uni. [Downloadable!]
  9. Luis H.B. Braido, 2005. "Risk and Insurance in Sharecropping," Risk and Insurance 0508002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  10. Luis H.B. Braido, 2005. "Evidence on the Incentive Properties of Share Contracts," Development and Comp Systems 0508013, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  11. Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, 1999. "The Self-Enforcing Provisions of Oil and Gas Unit Operating Agreements: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 7142, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Fukunaga, Keita & Hueth, Brent, 2006. "Contractual Externalities and Contract Design -Evidence from Farmland Lease Contracts in U.S. Agriculture," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21368, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  13. Lee J. Alston & Joseph P. Ferrie, 2005. "Time on the Ladder: Career Mobility in Agriculture, 1890-1938," NBER Working Papers 11231, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Qiu, Feng & Goodwin, Barry K. & Gervais, Jean-Philippe, 2009. "The Impacts of Government Programs on Farmland Rental Contract Choices: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 49242, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
  15. Koyin Chang & John Garen, 2004. "Residual income claimancy, monitoring, and the R&D firm: Theory with application to biotechs," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(8), pages 489-507. [Downloadable!]
  16. H. Peyton Young & Mary A. Burke, 2001. "Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 559-573, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. James D. Dana & Kathryn Spier, 2000. "Revenue Sharing, Demand Uncertainty, and Vertical Control of Competing Firms," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1511, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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