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Contract Duration and the Division of Labor in Agricultural Land Leases

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  • Jonathan Yoder
  • Ishrat Hossain
  • Francis Epplin
  • Damona Doye

    ()
    (School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University)

Abstract

This paper characterizes a set of Nash equilibria in a first-price sealed-bid auction with the right of first refusal using two bidders and asymmetric information regarding the bidders’ value distributions. The equilibria for multiple bidders and a more general value distribution are also presented

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University in its series Working Papers with number 2005-5.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: May 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wsu:wpaper:yoder-1

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Phone: 509-335-5555
Fax: 509-335-1173
Web page: http://faculty.ses.wsu.edu/
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Related research

Keywords: repeated auction; land lease contracts; moral hazard; contract duration; division of labor;

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References

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  1. Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, 1993. "Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 78-100, Spring.
  2. Allen, Douglas W & Lueck, Dean, 1995. "Risk Preferences and the Economics of Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 447-51, May.
  3. Canice Prendergast, 2002. "The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 1071-1102, October.
  4. Bengt Holmstrom, 1997. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1205, David K. Levine.
  5. Kees Jan Van Garderen & Chandra Shah, 2002. "Exact interpretation of dummy variables in semilogarithmic equations," Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 5(1), pages 149-159, June.
  6. Cheung, Steven N S, 1969. "Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 23-42, April.
  7. Shelanski, Howard A & Klein, Peter G, 1995. "Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 335-61, October.
  8. Gray, Jo Anna, 1978. "On Indexation and Contract Length," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(1), pages 1-18, February.
  9. Robert Rich & Joe Tracy, 2000. "Uncertainty and labor contract durations," Staff Reports 106, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  10. Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, 1988. "Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 327-343, Autumn.
  11. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-40, September.
  12. Joskow, Paul L, 1987. "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 168-85, March.
  13. Wallace, Frederick H. & Blanco, Herminio, 1991. "The effects of real and nominal shocks on union-firm contract duration," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 361-380, June.
  14. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 219-55, April.
  15. Danziger, Leif, 1988. "Real Shocks, Efficient Risk Sharing, and the Duration of Labor Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 435-40, May.
  16. Allen, Douglas W & Lueck, Dean, 1999. "The Role of Risk in Contract Choice," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 704-36, October.
  17. Rao, C H Hanumantha, 1971. "Uncertainty, Entrepreneurship, and Sharecropping in India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(3), pages 578-95, May-June.
  18. Lorenzo Cappellari & Stephen P. Jenkins, 2003. "Multivariate probit regression using simulated maximum likelihood," United Kingdom Stata Users' Group Meetings 2003 10, Stata Users Group.
  19. Eswaran, Mukesh & Kotwal, Ashok, 1985. "A Theory of Contractual Structure in Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 352-67, June.
  20. Allen, Douglas W & Lueck, Dean, 1992. "The "Back Forty" on a Handshake: Specific Assets, Reputation, and the Structure of Farmland Contracts," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 366-76, April.
  21. Leffler, Keith B & Rucker, Randal R, 1991. "Transactions Costs and the Efficient Organization of Production: A Study of Timber-Harvesting Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 1060-87, October.
  22. Hallagan, William S., 1978. "Share contracting for California Gold," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 196-210, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Beyene, Abebe D. & Bezabih, Mintewab & Gebreegziabher, Zenebe, 2012. "Contract Duration under Incomplete Land Ownership Rights: Empirical Evidence from Rural Ethiopia," Discussion Papers dp-12-09-efd, Resources For the Future.
  2. Vondolia, Godwin K., 2011. "What do respondents bring into contingent valuation? A comparison of monetary and labour payment vehicles," Working Papers in Economics 508, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  3. Vondolia, Godwin Kofi & Eggert, Hakan & Navrud, Stale & Stage, Jesper, 2011. "What Do Respondents Bring to Contingent Valuation? A Comparison of Monetary and Labor Payment Vehicles," Discussion Papers dp-11-13-efd, Resources For the Future.

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