How competition controls team production: The case of fishing firms
AbstractUnder team production, those who monitor individual productivity are usually the only ones compensated with a residual that varies with the performance of the team. This pattern is efficient, as is shown by the prevalence of conventional firms, except for small teams and when specialized monitoring is ineffective. Profit sharing in repeated team production induces all team members to take disciplinary action against underperformers through switching and separation decisions, however. Such action provides effective self-enforcemnt when the markets for team members are competitive, even for large teams using specialized monitoring. The traditional share system of fishing firms shows that for this competition to provide powerful enough incentives the costs of switching teams and measuring team productivity must be bellow. Risk allocation may constrain the organizational design defined by the use of a share system. It does not account for its existence, however.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 261.
Date of creation: Nov 1997
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
Theory of the firm; team production; share contracts; profit sharing; remuneration systems; self-enforcement; fishing firms;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Incentives Matter, Soviet Edition
by Dick Langlois in Organizations and Markets on 2010-07-14 20:12:38
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