How (not) to Choose Peers in Studying Groups
AbstractThis paper analyzes social group formation when agents are subject to peer effects within groups increasing human capital and instantaneous utility. When agents are heterogeneous on two dimensions, ability and social skills, and monetary payments are not feasible the model predicts segregation at the top and at the bottom of the attribute space and bunching for heterogeneous intermediate types. Groups may be heterogeneous in taste types and more heterogeneous types are more likely to participate. The equilibrium allocation does not induce cost-efficient human capital accumulation. Introducing ability tracking may produce beneficial results despite decreasing differences in human capital production.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2006.79.
Date of creation: May 2006
Date of revision:
Education; Peer-effects; Matching; Group Formation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-07-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-EDU-2006-07-21 (Education)
- NEP-SOC-2006-07-21 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-URE-2006-07-21 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- James J. Heckman & Jora Stixrud & Sergio Urzua, 2006.
"The Effects of Cognitive and Noncognitive Abilities on Labor Market Outcomes and Social Behavior,"
NBER Working Papers
12006, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James J. Heckman & Jora Stixrud & Sergio Urzua, 2006. "The Effects of Cognitive and Noncognitive Abilities on Labor Market Outcomes and Social Behavior," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 411-482, July.
- Nicole Schneeweis & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, 2005.
"Peer effects in Austrian schools,"
Economics working papers
2005-02, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1986. "The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 105-137, October.
- Eric A. Hanushek & John F. Kain & Jacob M. Markman & Steven G. Rivkin, 2001.
"Does Peer Ability Affect Student Achievement?,"
NBER Working Papers
8502, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Donald Robertson & James Symons, 1996.
"Do peer Groups Matter? Peer Groups versus Schooling Effects on Academic Attainment,"
CEP Discussion Papers
dp0311, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Donald Robertson & James Symons, 2003. "Do Peer Groups Matter? Peer Group versus Schooling Effects on Academic Attainment," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 70(277), pages 31-53, February.
- David J. Zimmerman, 2003.
"Peer Effects in Academic Outcomes: Evidence from a Natural Experiment,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 85(1), pages 9-23, February.
- Zimmerman, David J., 1999. "Peer Effects in Academic Outcomes: Evidence From a Natural Experiment," Williams Project on the Economics of Higher Education DP-52, Department of Economics, Williams College.
- Bruce Sacerdote, 2000.
"Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates,"
NBER Working Papers
7469, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bruce Sacerdote, 2001. "Peer Effects With Random Assignment: Results For Dartmouth Roommates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(2), pages 681-704, May.
- Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug..
- Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1998. "Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 33-62, March.
- Dennis Epple & Elizabeth Newlon & Richard Romano, 2000.
"Ability Tracking, School Competition, and the Distribution of Educational Benefits,"
NBER Working Papers
7854, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Epple, Dennis & Newlon, Elizabeth & Romano, Richard, 2002. "Ability tracking, school competition, and the distribution of educational benefits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 1-48, January.
- Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna H., 2001. "Tiebout Economies with Differential Genetic Types and Endogenously Chosen Crowding Characteristics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 261-294, June.
- Shubik, Martin & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1983. "Approximate cores of replica games and economies : Part II: Set-up costs and firm formation in coalition production economies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 285-306, December.
- Caroline M. Hoxby, 2000. "The Effects Of Class Size On Student Achievement: New Evidence From Population Variation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1239-1285, November.
- McEwan, Patrick J., 2003. "Peer effects on student achievement: evidence from Chile," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 131-141, April.
- Gordon C. Winston & David J. Zimmerman, 2003.
"Peer Effects in Higher Education,"
Williams Project on the Economics of Higher Education
DP-64, Department of Economics, Williams College.
- Esfandiar Maasoumi & Daniel Millimet & Vasudha Rangaprasad, 2005. "Class Size and Educational Policy: Who Benefits from Smaller Classes?," Econometric Reviews, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 24(4), pages 333-368.
- Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1996. "The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 245-58.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (barbara racah).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.