On Private Incentives to Acquire Household Production Skills

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On Private Incentives to Acquire Household Production Skills

Author Info

Vagstad, S.

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Steinar Vagstad

Abstract

In non-cooperative models of the family, improved productivity in contribution to a family good typically implies that, in equilibrium, one contributes more to the public good, while one's spouse contributes less. Thus, improves contribution productivity has a negative strategic effect on one's utility. We show that this strategic effect tends to be stronger the lower is one's initial contribution productivity. Therefore, the most productive has the strongest incentives to improve his or her productivity, widening any initial productivity differences. Similar results are also obtained in a cooperative bargaining model with non-cooperation as the threat point.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bergen in its series Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen with number 1499.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:bereco:1499

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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway
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Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/
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Related research
Keywords: HOUSEHOLD ; PRODUCTIVITY ; FAMILY ; MEN ; WOMEN;

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Steinar Vagstad, 2001. "On private incentives to acquire household production skills," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 301-312. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Vagstad, S., 2001. "On Private Incentives to Aquire Household Production Skills," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 221, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

Cited by:
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Helmut Rainer, 2004. "Gender Discrimination and Effciency in Marriage: the Bargaining Family under Scrutiny," Economics Discussion Papers 586, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Helmut Rainer, 2005. "Gender Discrimination and Efficiency in Marriage: the Bargaining Family under Scrutiny," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0512, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm. [Downloadable!]
- Helmut Rainer, 2008. "Gender discrimination and efficiency in marriage: the bargaining family under scrutiny," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 305-329, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Andaluz, Joaquín & Marcén, Miriam & Molina, José Alberto, 2009. "Dynamics of intrahousehold bargaining," MPRA Paper 17742, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Andaluz, Joaquín & Marcén, Miriam & Molina, José Alberto, 2008. "Dynamics of Intrahousehold Bargaining," IZA Discussion Papers 3757, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
Miriam Beblo & Julio R. Robledo, 2003. "The wage gap and the leisure gap for double earner couples," Vienna Economics Papers 0404, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Miriam Beblo & Julio Robledo, 2008. "The wage gap and the leisure gap for double-earner couples," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 281-304, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2005. "Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2005-001, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2003. "Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor," Departmental Working Papers 1, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2007. "Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 763-793. [Downloadable!]
Shelly Lundberg, 2005. "The Division of Labor by New Parents: Does Child Gender Matter?," IZA Discussion Papers 1787, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]

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