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On Private Incentives to Aquire Household Production Skills

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Author Info

  • Vagstad, S.

Abstract

In non-cooperative family models, being good at contributing to family public good like household production may reduce one's utility, since it tends to crowd out contributions from one's spouse. Similar effects also arise in cooperative models with non-cooperative threat point: improved contribution productivity entails loss of bargaining power.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bergen in its series Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen with number 221.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:bereco:221

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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway
Phone: (+47)55589200
Fax: (+47)55589210
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Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/
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Keywords: PRODUCTIVITY ; FAMILY ; HOUSEHOLD ; SEX;

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Cited by:
  1. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Vagstad, Steinar, 2006. "Mommy tracks and public policy: on self-fulfilling prophecies and gender gaps in promotion," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-10, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  2. Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2003. "Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor," Departmental Working Papers 1, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
  3. Raphaela Hyee & Julio R. Robledo, . "Specialization in the bargaining family," Discussion Papers 10/06, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
  4. Mizuki Komura, 2013. "Fertility and endogenous gender bargaining power," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 943-961, July.
  5. Miriam Beblo & Julio Robledo, 2008. "The wage gap and the leisure gap for double-earner couples," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 281-304, April.
  6. Lundberg, Shelly, 2005. "The Division of Labor by New Parents: Does Child Gender Matter?," IZA Discussion Papers 1787, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Helmut Rainer, 2004. "Gender Discrimination and Effciency in Marriage: the Bargaining Family under Scrutiny," Economics Discussion Papers 586, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  8. Andaluz, Joaquín & Marcén, Miriam & Molina, José Alberto, 2008. "Dynamics of Intrahousehold Bargaining," IZA Discussion Papers 3757, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  9. Matthias Wrede, 2003. "The Income Splitting Method: Is it Good for Both Marriage Partners?," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 4(2), pages 203-216, 05.

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