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On private incentives to acquire household production skills

Author

Listed:
  • Steinar Vagstad

    (Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Fosswinckelsgate 6, N-5007 Bergen, Norway)

Abstract

In non-cooperative family models, being good at contributing to family public goods like household production may reduce one's utility, since it tends to crowd out contributions from one's spouse. Similar effects also arise in cooperative models with non-cooperative threat point: improved contribution productivity entails loss of bargaining power. This strategic effect must be traded against the benefits of household production skills, in terms of increased consumption possibilities. Since cooperation involves extensive specialization, incentives to acquire household production skills are strikingly asymmetric, with the one not specializing in household production having strong disincentives for household skill acquisition.

Suggested Citation

  • Steinar Vagstad, 2001. "On private incentives to acquire household production skills," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 14(2), pages 301-312.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:14:y:2001:i:2:p:301-312
    Note: Received: 06 July 1999/Accepted: 08 June 2000
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2007. "Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(4), pages 763-793.
    2. Mark D. Agee & Scott E. Atkinson & Thomas D. Crocker, 2008. "Multiple‐Output Child Health Production Functions: The Impact of Time‐Varying and Time‐Invariant Inputs," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(2), pages 410-428, August.
    3. Mark D. Agee & Scott E. Atkinson & Thomas D. Crocker, 2009. "Multiple‐Output Child Health Production Functions: The Impact of Time‐Varying and Time‐Invariant Inputs," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(3), pages 909-927, January.
    4. Auspurg, Katrin & Iacovou, Maria & Nicoletti, Cheti, 2014. "Housework Share between Partners: Experimental Evidence on Gender Identity," IZA Discussion Papers 8569, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Raphaela Hyee & Julio R. Robledo, 2009. "Specialization in the Bargaining Family," Working Papers 640, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    6. Wrede Matthias, 2003. "The Income Splitting Method: Is it Good for Both Marriage Partners?," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 203-216, May.
    7. Lommerud, K.E. & Vagstad, S., 2000. "Mommy Tracks and Public Policy: On Self-Fulfilling Prophecies and Gender Gaps in Promotion," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 0600, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
    8. Helmut Rainer, 2008. "Gender discrimination and efficiency in marriage: the bargaining family under scrutiny," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 21(2), pages 305-329, April.
    9. John Douglas Skåtun, 2017. "Bargaining on your Spouse: Coasean and Non-Coasean Behaviour Within Marriage," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 263-278, June.
    10. Raphaela Hyee & Julio R. Robledo, 2009. "Specialization in the Bargaining Family," Working Papers 640, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    11. Miriam Beblo & Julio Robledo, 2008. "The wage gap and the leisure gap for double-earner couples," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 21(2), pages 281-304, April.
    12. Keisuke Kawata & Mizuki Komura, 2015. "The Gender Division of Labor: A Joint Marriage and Job Search Model," IDEC DP2 Series 5-1, Hiroshima University, Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation (IDEC).
    13. Andaluz, Joaquín & Marcén, Miriam & Molina, José Alberto, 2008. "Dynamics of Intrahousehold Bargaining," IZA Discussion Papers 3757, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Straume, Odd Rune & Vagstad, Steinar, 2015. "Mommy tracks and public policy: On self-fulfilling prophecies and gender gaps in hiring and promotion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 540-554.
    15. Lundberg, Shelly, 2005. "The Division of Labor by New Parents: Does Child Gender Matter?," IZA Discussion Papers 1787, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    16. Mizuki Komura, 2013. "Fertility and endogenous gender bargaining power," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 26(3), pages 943-961, July.
    17. You, Jing & Yi, Xuejie & Chen, Meng, 2016. "Love, Life, and “Leftover Ladies” in Urban China," MPRA Paper 70494, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Miriam Beblo & Julio Robledo, 2008. "The wage gap and the leisure gap for double-earner couples," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 21(2), pages 281-304, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Family bargaining · household productivity · gender roles;

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

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