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On private incentives to acquire household production skills

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  • Steinar Vagstad

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Fosswinckelsgate 6, N-5007 Bergen, Norway)

Abstract

In non-cooperative family models, being good at contributing to family public goods like household production may reduce one's utility, since it tends to crowd out contributions from one's spouse. Similar effects also arise in cooperative models with non-cooperative threat point: improved contribution productivity entails loss of bargaining power. This strategic effect must be traded against the benefits of household production skills, in terms of increased consumption possibilities. Since cooperation involves extensive specialization, incentives to acquire household production skills are strikingly asymmetric, with the one not specializing in household production having strong disincentives for household skill acquisition.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Population Economics.

Volume (Year): 14 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 301-312

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:14:y:2001:i:2:p:301-312

Note: Received: 06 July 1999/Accepted: 08 June 2000
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Related research

Keywords: Family bargaining · household productivity · gender roles;

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Cited by:
  1. Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2007. "Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 763-793.
  2. Lommerud, K.E. & Vagstad, S., 2000. "Mommy Tracks and Public Policy: On Self-Fulfilling Prophecies and Gender Gaps in Promotion," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 0600, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
  3. Mizuki Komura, 2013. "Fertility and endogenous gender bargaining power," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 943-961, July.
  4. Andaluz, Joaquín & Marcén, Miriam & Molina, José Alberto, 2009. "Dynamics of intrahousehold bargaining," MPRA Paper 17742, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Raphaela Hyee & Julio R. Robledo, 2009. "Specialization in the Bargaining Family," Working Papers 640, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  6. Lundberg, Shelly, 2005. "The Division of Labor by New Parents: Does Child Gender Matter?," IZA Discussion Papers 1787, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Miriam Beblo & Julio Robledo, 2008. "The wage gap and the leisure gap for double-earner couples," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 281-304, April.
  8. Matthias Wrede, 2003. "The Income Splitting Method: Is it Good for Both Marriage Partners?," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 4(2), pages 203-216, 05.
  9. Helmut Rainer, 2008. "Gender discrimination and efficiency in marriage: the bargaining family under scrutiny," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 305-329, April.

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