On private incentives to acquire household production skills
AbstractIn non-cooperative family models, being good at contributing to family public goods like household production may reduce one's utility, since it tends to crowd out contributions from one's spouse. Similar effects also arise in cooperative models with non-cooperative threat point: improved contribution productivity entails loss of bargaining power. This strategic effect must be traded against the benefits of household production skills, in terms of increased consumption possibilities. Since cooperation involves extensive specialization, incentives to acquire household production skills are strikingly asymmetric, with the one not specializing in household production having strong disincentives for household skill acquisition.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Population Economics.
Volume (Year): 14 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Note: Received: 06 July 1999/Accepted: 08 June 2000
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00148/index.htm
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Other versions of this item:
- Vagstad, S., 1999. "On Private Incentives to Acquire Household Production Skills," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 1499, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- Vagstad, S., 2001. "On Private Incentives to Aquire Household Production Skills," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 221, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
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