Specialization in the Bargaining Family
AbstractWe develop a two period family decision making model in which spouses bargain over their contributions to a family public good and the distribution of private consumption. In contrast to most models in the literature, specialization within the couple emerges endogenously from the production of the public good, and is not caused by exogenous differences between the spouses. Increasing marginal benefits of labour market experience make specialization efficient, even if both spouses have equal market and household productivities on the outset. If spouses are not able to enter into a binding contract governing the distribution of private consumption in the second period, the spouse specialized in market labour cannot commit to compensate the other spouse for foregone investments in earnings power. As a consequence, this spouse may withdraw part of his/her contribution and the provision level of the household good is likely to be inefficiently low.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 640.
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Family bargaining; Specialization; Private provision of public goods;
Other versions of this item:
- D19 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Other
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, October.
- Vagstad, S., 2001.
"On Private Incentives to Aquire Household Production Skills,"
Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen
221, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- Steinar Vagstad, 2001. "On private incentives to acquire household production skills," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 301-312.
- Vagstad, S., 1999. "On Private Incentives to Acquire Household Production Skills," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 1499, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- Kemnitz, Alexander & Thum, Marcel, 2013.
"Gender Power, Fertility, and Family Policy,"
Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order
79827, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Kemnitz, Alexander & Thum, Marcel, 2013. "Gender power, fertility, and family policy," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 01/13, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
- Alexander Kemnitz & Marcel Thum, 2012. "Gender Power, Fertility, and Family Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3798, CESifo Group Munich.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nick Vriend).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.