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Specialization in the Bargaining Family

Author

Listed:
  • Raphaela Hyee

    (Queen Mary, University of London)

  • Julio R. Robledo

    (University of Nottingham)

Abstract

We develop a two period family decision making model in which spouses bargain over their contributions to a family public good and the distribution of private consumption. In contrast to most models in the literature, specialization within the couple emerges endogenously from the production of the public good, and is not caused by exogenous differences between the spouses. Increasing marginal benefits of labour market experience make specialization efficient, even if both spouses have equal market and household productivities on the outset. If spouses are not able to enter into a binding contract governing the distribution of private consumption in the second period, the spouse specialized in market labour cannot commit to compensate the other spouse for foregone investments in earnings power. As a consequence, this spouse may withdraw part of his/her contribution and the provision level of the household good is likely to be inefficiently low.

Suggested Citation

  • Raphaela Hyee & Julio R. Robledo, 2009. "Specialization in the Bargaining Family," Working Papers 640, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    • Handle: RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:640
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    File URL: https://www.qmul.ac.uk/sef/media/econ/research/workingpapers/2009/items/wp640.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Kemnitz & Marcel Thum, 2015. "Gender Power, Fertility, and Family Policy," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(1), pages 220-247, January.
    2. Elisabeth Gugl & Linda Welling, 2017. "Efficiency of Family Bargaining Models with Renegotiation: The Role of Transferable Utility across Periods," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 5(1), pages 53-83, June.
    3. Malcolm, Michael & Abdurrahman, Zainab, 2014. "The High Cost Of Specialization: Labor Market Outcomes Following Divorce," Review of Applied Economics, Lincoln University, Department of Financial and Business Systems, vol. 10(1-2), January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Family bargaining; Specialization; Private provision of public goods;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D19 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Other
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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