Gender Power, Fertility, and Family Policy
AbstractThe birth of children often shifts the power balance within a family. If family decisions are made according to the spouses' welfare function, this shift in power may lead to a time consistency problem. The allocation of resources after the birth of children may differ from the ex-ante optimal choice. In a model of cooperative decision making within a family, we show that this time consistency problem leads to a systematic downward bias in fertility choices. By keeping fertility low, families try to mitigate the ex-ante undesired shift in the power balance. This bias in fertility choices provides scope for welfare enhancing policy intervention. We discuss the extent to which existing measures in family policy are suitable to overcome the fertility bias. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association in its series Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order with number 79827.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Kemnitz, Alexander & Thum, Marcel, 2013. "Gender power, fertility, and family policy," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 01/13, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
- Alexander Kemnitz & Marcel Thum, 2012. "Gender Power, Fertility, and Family Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3798, CESifo Group Munich.
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-02-02 (All new papers)
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