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Marriage with Labor Supply

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  • Nicolas Jacquemet

    ()
    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris)

  • Jean-Marc Robin

    ()
    (Sciences Po - Department of Economics)

Abstract

We propose a search-matching model of the marriage market that extends Shimer and Smith (2000) to allow for labor supply. We characterize the steady-state equilibrium when exogenous divorce is the only source of risk. The estimated matching probabilities that can be derived from the steady-state flow conditions are strongly increasing in both male and female wages. We estimate that the share of marriage surplus appropriated by the man increases with his wage and that the share appropriated by the woman decreases with her wage. We find that leisure is an inferior good for men and a normal good for women.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00639313.

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Date of creation: Oct 2011
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Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00639313

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Keywords: Marriage search model; collective labor supply; structural estimation.;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Zvi Eckstein, 2012. "Household Interaction and the Labor Supply of Married Women," 2012 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 18, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  2. Luca Flabbi and James Mabli, 2012. "Household Search or Individual Search: Does It Matter? Evidence from Lifetime Inequality Estimates," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics gueconwpa~12-12-03, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  3. Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner & Georgi Kocharkov & Cezar Santos, 2012. "Technology and the Changing Family: A Unified Model of Marriage, Divorce, Educational Attainment and Married Female Labor-Force Participation," NBER Working Papers 17735, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Raquel Fernández & Joyce Cheng Wong, 2014. "Free to Leave? A Welfare Analysis of Divorce Regimes," NBER Working Papers 20251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Clement Joubert & Sekyu Choi, 2012. "The value of remarriage," 2012 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 1111, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  6. Bernard Salanié & Alfred Galichon, 2012. "Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/5rkqqmvrn4t, Sciences Po.
  7. Raquel Fernández & Joyce C. Wong, 2014. "Divorce Risk, Wages, and Working Wives: A Quantitative Life-Cycle Analysis of Female Labor Force Participation," NBER Working Papers 19869, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Christian Bayer & Klaus Waelde, 2011. "Describing the Dynamics of Distributions in Search and Matching Models by Fokker-Planck Equations," Working Papers 1110, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 21 Jul 2011.
  9. Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon, 2012. "Personality Traits and the Marriage Market," Working Papers 2012/41, Maastricht School of Management.
  10. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Costas Meghir, 2014. "Intrahousehold Inequality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1948, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  11. John A. Knowles, 2013. "Why are Married Men Working So Much? An Aggregate Analysis of Intra-Household Bargaining and Labour Supply," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(3), pages 1055-1085.

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