Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Marriage with Labor Supply

Contents:

Author Info

  • Nicholas Jacquemet

    (PSE)

  • Jean-Marc Robin

    (Sciences Po and UCL)

Abstract

In this paper we design a search-matching models similar to that can both explain the formation of couples and select the equilibrium on the curve of optimal contracts. We study identification from cross sections. The model is non parametrically estimated using the SIPP data.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2011/paper_446.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2011 Meeting Papers with number 446.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:red:sed011:446

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Fax: 1-314-444-8731
Email:
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Grossbard-Shechtman, Shoshana Amyra, 1984. "A Theory of Allocation of Time in Markets for Labour and Marriage," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376), pages 863-82, December.
  2. Sattinger, Michael, 1995. "Search and the Efficient Assignment of Workers to Jobs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 283-302, May.
  3. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Iyigun, Murat & Weiss, Yoram, 2008. "An Assignment Model with Divorce and Remarriage," IZA Discussion Papers 3892, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner & John Knowles, 2000. "Women on Welfare: A Macroeconomic Analysis," RCER Working Papers 466, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  5. Blundell, Richard & Chiappori, Pierre-André & Magnac, Thierry & Meghir, Costas, 2005. "Collective Labour Supply: Heterogeneity and Nonparticipation," IZA Discussion Papers 1785, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Shannon N. Seitz, 2002. "Accounting for Racial Differences in Marriage and Employment," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 1009, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  7. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Yoram Weiss & Murat Iyigun & Yoram Weiss, 2006. "Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market," 2006 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 43, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  8. Jan Eeckhout, 1996. "Bilateral Search and Vertical Heterogeneity," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE /1996/315, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  9. Daniela Del Boca & Christopher J. Flinn, 2005. "Household Time Allocation and Modes of Behavior: A Theory of Sorts," CHILD Working Papers, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY wp15_05, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
  10. Pierre-André Chiappori & Yoram Weiss, 2007. "Divorce, Remarriage, and Child Support," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 37-74.
  11. Elizabeth M. Caucutt & Nezih Guner & John Knowles, 2002. "Why Do Women Wait? Matching, Wage Inequality, and the Incentives for Fertility Delay," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 5(4), pages 815-855, October.
  12. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy, 2001. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation and Household Labor Supply," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique 0103, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
  13. Michael J. Brien, 1997. "Racial Differences in Marriage and the Role of Marriage Markets," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 32(4), pages 741-778.
  14. Pierre-André Chiappori & Sonia Oreffice, 2008. "Birth Control and Female Empowerment: An Equilibrium Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(1), pages 113-140, 02.
  15. Gould, Eric D. & Paserman, M. Daniele, 2003. "Waiting for Mr. Right: rising inequality and declining marriage rates," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 257-281, March.
  16. Browning, M. & Bourguignon, F. & Chiappori, P.A. & Lechene, V., 1992. "Incomes and Outcomes: A structural Model of Intra-Household Allocation," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) 92-23, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  17. Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy, 1997. "A Test of the Unitary and Collective Models of Household Labour Supply," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 933-55, July.
  18. Grossbard, Shoshana & Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina, 2007. "Cohort-Level Sex Ratio Effects on Women’s Labor Force Participation," IZA Discussion Papers 2722, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  19. Eugene Choo & Shannon Seitz & Aloysius Siow, 2008. "The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation and Testing," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics tecipa-340, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  20. Aiyagari, S.R. & Greenwood, J. & Guner, N., 1999. "On the State of the Union," RCER Working Papers 462, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  21. Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics 91-08, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  22. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
  23. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Yoram Weiss, 2006. "Divorce, Remarriage, and Welfare: A General Equilibrium Approach," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 4(2-3), pages 415-426, 04-05.
  24. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Donni, Olivier, 2009. "Non-unitary Models of Household Behavior: A Survey of the Literature," IZA Discussion Papers 4603, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  25. Linda Y. Wong, 2001. "Structural Estimation of Marriage Models," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001, Society for Computational Economics 222, Society for Computational Economics.
  26. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
  27. Becker, Gary S & Lewis, H Gregg, 1973. "On the Interaction between the Quantity and Quality of Children," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages S279-88, Part II, .
  28. Pierre Cahuc & Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2006. "Wage bargaining with on-the-job search: theory and evidence," Working Papers 150201, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
  29. Shelly J. Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak & Terence J. Wales, 1997. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 32(3), pages 463-480.
  30. Eugene Choo & Aloysius Siow, 2006. "Who Marries Whom and Why," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 175-201, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Raquel Fernández & Joyce Cheng Wong, 2014. "Free to Leave? A Welfare Analysis of Divorce Regimes," NBER Working Papers 20251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Bernard Salanié & Alfred Galichon, 2011. "Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models," Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics 1011-03, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  3. Raquel Fernández & Joyce C. Wong, 2014. "Divorce Risk, Wages, and Working Wives: A Quantitative Life-Cycle Analysis of Female Labor Force Participation," NBER Working Papers 19869, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner & Georgi Kocharkov & Cezar Santos, 2011. "Technology and the Changing Family: A Unified Model of Marriage, Divorce, Educational Attainment and Married Female Labor-Force Participation," Economie d'Avant Garde Research Reports, Economie d'Avant Garde 18, Economie d'Avant Garde.
  5. Clement Joubert & Sekyu Choi, 2012. "The value of remarriage," 2012 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 1111, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  6. Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon, 2012. "Personality Traits and the Marriage Market," Working Papers, Maastricht School of Management 2012/41, Maastricht School of Management.
  7. Pierre-André Chiappori & Costas Meghir, 2014. "Intrahousehold Inequality," NBER Working Papers 20191, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Eckstein, Zvi & Lifshitz, Osnat, 2013. "Household Interaction and the Labor Supply of Married Women," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 9258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Flabbi, Luca & Mabli, James, 2012. "Household Search or Individual Search: Does It Matter? Evidence from Lifetime Inequality Estimates," IZA Discussion Papers 6908, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Christian Bayer & Klaus Waelde, 2011. "Describing the Dynamics of Distributions in Search and Matching Models by Fokker-Planck Equations," Working Papers, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz 1110, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 21 Jul 2011.
  11. John A. Knowles, 2013. "Why are Married Men Working So Much? An Aggregate Analysis of Intra-Household Bargaining and Labour Supply," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(3), pages 1055-1085.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed011:446. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.