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Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market

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Author Info
Pierre-André Chiappori () (Columbia University)
Murat Iyigun () (University of Colorado, Sabanci University and IZA Bonn)
Yoram Weiss () (Tel Aviv University and IZA Bonn)

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Abstract

We present a model with pre-marital schooling investment, endogenous marital matching and spousal specialization in homework and market production. Investment in schooling raises ages and generates two kinds of returns in our framework: a labor-market return and a marriage-market return because education can affect the intra-marital share of the surplus one can extract from marriage. When the returns to education and household roles are gender neutral, men and women educate in equal proportions and there is pure positive assortative matching in the marriage market. But if men and women have different market returns or household roles, then there may be mixing in equilibrium where some educated individuals marry uneducated spouses and those who educate less extract a relatively larger share of the marital surplus. The existence of large and frictionless marriage markets creates competition among potential spouses, precludes bargaining and generates premarital investments that are efficient. Given that the gender wage gap narrows with the level of education, women’s labor-market return from schooling is higher than that of men. Moreover, women’s household time obligations have declined over time, raising their marriage-market return from schooling. Combining these two effects, we explain why women now attain higher schooling levels than men.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2454.

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Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2006
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Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2454

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Related research
Keywords: pre-marital investments; matching; intra-household allocations;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz & Ilyana Kuziemko, 2006. "The Homecoming of American College Women: The Reversal of the College Gender Gap," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 133-156, Fall.
    Other versions:
  2. Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2002. "Competing Premarital Investments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 592-608, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Albanesi, Stefania & Olivetti, Claudia, 2005. "Home Production, Market Production and the Gender Wage Gap: Incentives and Expectations," CEPR Discussion Papers 4984, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2001. "Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 333-373, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Michael C. Burda & Daniel S. Hamermesh & Philippe Weil, 2006. "The Distribution of Total Work in the EU and US," IZA Discussion Papers 2270, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  6. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Murat Iyigun, 2005. "Bargaining and Specialization in Marriage," IZA Discussion Papers 1744, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  8. Mark Aguiar & Erik Hurst, 2006. "Measuring trends in leisure: the allocation of time over five decades," Working Papers 06-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Felli, Leonardo & Roberts, Kevin W S, 2002. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3535, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Yoram Weiss, 1981. "Expected Interruptions in Labor Force Participation and Sex Related Differences in Earnings Growth," NBER Working Papers 0667, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Pierre-André Chiappori & Yoram Weiss, 2007. "Divorce, Remarriage, and Child Support," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 37-74. [Downloadable!]
  12. June E. O'Neill & Dave M. O'Neill, 2005. "What Do Wage Differentials Tell Us about Labor Market Discrimination?," NBER Working Papers 11240, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Lommerud, K.E. & Vagstad, S., 2000. "Mommy Tracks and Public Policy: On Self-Fulfilling Prophecies and Gender Gaps in Promotion," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 0600, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
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  15. Jeremy Greenwood & Ananth Seshadri & Mehmet Yorukoglu, 2005. "Engines of Liberation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 72(1), pages 109-133, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Casey B. Mulligan & Yona Rubinstein, 2005. "Selection, Investment, and Women's Relative Wages Since 1975," NBER Working Papers 11159, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  18. Stefania Albanesi & Claudia Olivetti, 2006. "Gender roles and technological progress," 2006 Meeting Papers 411, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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  19. Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2005. "Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2005-001, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  20. Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polacheck, 1974. "Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings of Women," NBER Chapters, in: Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children, and Human Capital, pages 397-431 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
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  23. Graciela Chichilnisky, 2008. "The Gender Gap," Review of Development Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(4), pages 828-844, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ximena Peña, . "Assortative Matching and the Education Gap," Borradores de Economia 427, Banco de la Republica de Colombia. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Iyigun, Murat & Weiss, Yoram, 2008. "An Assignment Model with Divorce and Remarriage," IZA Discussion Papers 3892, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  3. Michael Svarer & Helena Skyt Nielsen, 2006. "Educational Homogamy: Preferences or Opportunities?," Economics Working Papers 2006-10, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Alison L. Booth & Melvyn B. Coles, 2008. "Tax Policy and Returns to Education," CEPR Discussion Papers 591, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Eugene Choo & Shannon Seitz & Aloysius Siow, 2008. "The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation and Testing," Working Papers tecipa-340, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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