Divorce, Remarriage, and Child Support
AbstractThere is some evidence that children of divorced parents do not perform as well as comparable children in intact families but that this gap declines with the aggregate divorce rate. We develop a model in which the higher expectations for remarriage associated with higher divorce rates can trigger an equilibrium in which divorced fathers make more generous transfers that benefit their children and the mother in the aftermath of divorce. As a result, the welfare loss of children from the separation of their parents can be lower when divorce and remarriage rates rise.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.
Volume (Year): 25 (2007)
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