IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/isfiwp/275694.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Divorce, Remarriage and Child Support

Author

Listed:
  • Chiappori, Pierre-Andre
  • Weiss, Yoram

Abstract

Modern marriage markets display increasing turnover, with less marriage but more divorce and remarriage. As a consequence, a large number of children live in single parent and step parent households. There is substantial evidence that children of divorced parents do not perform as well as comparable children in intact families. However, there is also some evidence that this gap declines with the aggregate divorce rate. We develop a model in which the higher expectations for remarriage associated with higher divorce rates can trigger an equilibrium in which divorced fathers make more generous transfers that benefit their children and the mother in the aftermath of divorce. As a result, the welfare loss of children from the separation of their parents can be lower when divorce and remarriage rates rise.

Suggested Citation

  • Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Weiss, Yoram, 2006. "Divorce, Remarriage and Child Support," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275694, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275694
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275694
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275694/files/2-2006.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.275694?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peter A. Diamond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 282-316, Spring.
    2. Anne Case & I-Fen Lin & Sara Mclanahan, 2003. "Explaining trends in child support: Economic, demographic, and policy effects," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 40(1), pages 171-189, February.
    3. S. Rao Aiyagari & Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner, 2000. "On the State of the Union," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 213-244, April.
    4. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 881-894, October.
    5. Richard Breen & Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa, 2002. "Bayesian Learning and Gender Segregation," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(4), pages 899-922, October.
    6. Daniela Del Boca, 2003. "Mothers, fathers and children after divorce: The role of institutions," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 16(3), pages 399-422, August.
    7. Claudia Olivetti & Stefania Albanesi, 2005. "Home Production, Market Production and the Gender Wage Gap: Incentives and Expectations," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-013, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    8. Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1998. "Class systems and the enforcement of social norms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 5-35, October.
    9. repec:pri:cheawb:case_child_support.pdf is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, 2000. "Power Couples: Changes in the Locational Choice of the College Educated, 1940–1990," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(4), pages 1287-1315.
    11. Dan Black & Gary Gates & Seth Sanders & Lowell Taylor, 2000. "Demographics of the gay and lesbian population in the United States: Evidence from available systematic data sources," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 37(2), pages 139-154, May.
    12. Lommerud, K.E. & Vagstad, S., 2000. "Mommy Tracks and Public Policy: On Self-Fulfilling Prophecies and Gender Gaps in Promotion," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 0600, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
    13. repec:pri:cheawb:case_child_support is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Burdett, Kenneth & Coles, Melvyn G, 1999. "Long-Term Partnership Formation: Marriage and Employment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(456), pages 307-334, June.
    15. Jonathan Gruber, 2004. "Is Making Divorce Easier Bad for Children? The Long-Run Implications of Unilateral Divorce," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(4), pages 799-834, October.
    16. Ishida, Junichiro, 2003. "The role of social norms in a model of marriage and divorce," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 131-142, May.
    17. Robert I. Lerman & Elaine Sorenson, 2003. "Child Support: Interactions between Private and Public Transfers," NBER Chapters, in: Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States, pages 587-628, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Becker, Gary S & Landes, Elisabeth M & Michael, Robert T, 1977. "An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(6), pages 1141-1187, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pierre-André Chiappori & Murat Iyigun & Yoram Weiss, 2009. "Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1689-1713, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pierre-André Chiappori & Yoram Weiss, 2007. "Divorce, Remarriage, and Child Support," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 37-74.
    2. Gutierrez, Federico H., 2019. "Will You Marry Me ... if Our Children Are Healthy? The Impact of Maternal Age and the Associated Risk of Having a Child with Health Problems on Family Structure," GLO Discussion Paper Series 354, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    3. Wolfgang Frimmel & Martin Halla & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, 2016. "How Does Parental Divorce Affect Children's Long-term Outcomes?," Working Papers 2016-13, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    4. Katie R. Genadek, 2018. "Unilateral Divorce and Time Allocation in the United States," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(1), pages 63-87, January.
    5. Bjerk, David, 2009. "Beauty vs. earnings: Gender differences in earnings and priorities over spousal characteristics in a matching model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 248-259, March.
    6. Stefania Marcassa, 2011. "Divorce Laws and Divorce Rate in the U.S," Working Papers 2011-009, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    7. Abi Adams & Laurens Cherchye & Bram De Rock & Ewout Verriest, 2014. "Consume Now or Later? Time Inconsistency, Collective Choice, and Revealed Preference," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(12), pages 4147-4183, December.
    8. Melissa Ruby Banzhaf, 2018. "When It Rains, It Pours: Under What Circumstances Does Job Loss Lead to Divorce," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 85(2), pages 349-377, October.
    9. Lauermann, Stephan & Nöldeke, Georg, 2014. "Stable marriages and search frictions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 163-195.
    10. Fernández-Kranz, Daniel & Roff, Jennifer Louise & Sun, Hugette, 2018. "Can Reduced Child Support Make Joint Custody Bad for Children? The Role of Economic Incentives in U.S. Divorce Law on Child Outcomes," IZA Discussion Papers 12025, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & Ricardo Lagos, 2007. "A Model of Job and Worker Flows," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(5), pages 770-819, October.
    12. Bargain, Olivier & González, Libertad & Keane, Claire & Özcan, Berkay, 2012. "Female labor supply and divorce: New evidence from Ireland," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1675-1691.
    13. Li, Li & Mak, Eric, 2016. "Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage: The Catalyst Effect of Unilateral Divorce," MPRA Paper 83330, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Martin Halla, 2013. "The Effect Of Joint Custody On Family Outcomes," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 278-315, April.
    15. Peter Diamond, 2011. "Unemployment, Vacancies, Wages," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1045-1072, June.
    16. Pierre-André Chiappori & Murat Iyigun & Yoram Weiss, 2009. "Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1689-1713, December.
    17. Elizabeth O. Ananat & Guy Michaels, 2008. "The Effect of Marital Breakup on the Income Distribution of Women with Children," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 43(3), pages 611-629.
    18. John Kennes & John Knowles, 2024. "Unmarried Births: Accounting and Equilibrium Analysis"," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 52, pages 84-109, April.
    19. Coen N. Teulings & Pieter A. Gautier, 2004. "The Right Man for the Job," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(2), pages 553-580.
    20. Iyigun, Murat & Walsh, Randall P., 2007. "Endogenous gender power, household labor supply and the demographic transition," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 138-155, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial Economics; Public Economics;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275694. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fotauil.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.