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An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States

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Author Info
Peter A. Diamond
Eric Maskin

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Abstract

We study the steady-state equilibrium of models where individuals meet pairwise in a costly stochastic search process and negotiate contracts to product output. Different meetings yield different outputs, and so an individual in a contract may wish to continue search to find a better match. If he is successful, he will break his original contract. In anticipation of possible breaches, contracts may provide for compensation to be paid to the breached-against partner. We examine the effects that several alternative damage rules have on equilibrium search and breach behavior.

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File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X%28197921%2910%3A1%3C282%3AAEAOSA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E&origin=repec
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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 10 (1979)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 282-316
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Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:10:y:1979:i:spring:p:282-316

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  1. Feess, Eberhard & Frick, Bernd & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2004. "Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Theory and Evidence from German Soccer," IZA Discussion Papers 1180, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  2. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Bargaining," Working Papers 2007-06, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
  3. Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & Ricardo Lagos, 2006. "A model of job and worker flows," Staff Report 358, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Steven Shavell, 1981. "On the Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach," NBER Working Papers 0727, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Elazar Berkovitch, 1985. "Reputation Effect in Equilibrium Search and Bargaining- A Stigma Theory of Unemployment Duration," Discussion Papers 668, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  6. Tracy J. Cornelius, 2003. "A Search Model of Marriage and Divorce," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(1), pages 135-155, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, 2001. "Bilateral Trade and Opportunism in a Matching Market," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 1(contribut), pages 1030-1030. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Alain Béraud, 2008. "La Place De La Notion De Chômage Involontaire Dans La Théorie Keynésienne De L’Emploi," THEMA Working Papers 2008-16, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Charles North, 2001. "Remedies for misrepresentation in applications in the presence of fraudulent intent," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 29(2), pages 162-176, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Pierre-André Chiappori & Murat Iyigun & Yoram Weiss, 2007. "Public Goods, Transferable Utility and Divorce Laws," IZA Discussion Papers 2646, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  11. Moen, Espen R & Riis, Christian, 2005. "Efficient Exclusion," CEPR Discussion Papers 5257, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Gerd Muehlheusser, 2006. "Regulating Damage Clauses in (Labor) Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 2367, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  13. Patricia M. Anderson & Simon M. Burgess, 1995. "Empirical Matching Functions: Estimation and Interpretation Using Disaggregate Data," NBER Working Papers 5001, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Thomas Tröger & Georg Nöldeke, 2009. "Matching Heterogeneous Agents with a Linear Search Technology," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse1_2009, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  15. Eduardo Siandra, 1990. "Money and Specialization in Production," UCLA Economics Working Papers 610, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Gianni De Fraja & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Walras Retrouve: Decentralized Trading Mechanisms and the Competitive Price," ESE Discussion Papers 36, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Abbring, Jaap H., 1999. "Commitment and wage bargaining in job matching models with costly search," Serie Research Memoranda 0021, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Luigi Zingales, 1996. "Corporate Ownership Structures: Private versus Social Optimality," NBER Working Papers 5584, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Eberhard Feess & Bernd Frick & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2004. "Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Theory and Evidence from German Soccer," Diskussionsschriften dp0411, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
  20. Haghiri, M. & Phillips, P.W.B., 2001. "Trade In The Market Of Biotechnological Livestock Products And The Theory Of The Intermediary Firms," International Trade in Livestock Products Symposium, January 18-19, 2001, Auckland, New Zealand 14542, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium. [Downloadable!]
  21. Christopher J. Mayer, 1993. "A model of real estate auctions versus negotiated sales," Working Papers 93-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
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