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Class systems and the enforcement of social norms

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Author Info
Harold L. Cole
George J. Mailath
Andrew Postlewaite

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Abstract

We analyze a model in which there is socially inefficient competition among people. In this model, self-enforcing social norms can potentially control the inefficient competition. However, the inefficient behavior often cannot be suppressed in equilibrium among those with the lowest income due to the ineffectiveness of sanctions against those in the society with the least to lose. We demonstrate that in such cases, it may be possible for society to be divided into distinct classes, with inefficient behavior suppressed in the upper classes but not in the lower.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its series Staff Report with number 213.

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Date of creation: 1996
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmsr:213

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Keywords: Income distribution ; Wealth;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1986. "Limit games and limit equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 261-279, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 1995. "Incorporating concern for relative wealth into economic models," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Sum, pages 12-21. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Friedman, James W., 1985. "Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 390-398, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-22, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Mailath, George J, 1987. "Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1349-65, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Cole, Harold L & Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1995. "Aristocratic Equilibria: Response," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(2), pages 439-43, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2004. "Status, Inequality and Growth," ESE Discussion Papers 123, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ed Hopkins, 2006. "Job Market Signalling of Relative Position, or Becker Married to Spence," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000553, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Pérez Truglia, Ricardo Nicolás, 2007. "Can a rise in income inequality improve welfare?," MPRA Paper 4700, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Dec 2007. [Downloadable!]
  4. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2006. "Which Inequality? The Inequality of Resources Versus the Inequality of Rewards," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000621, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Calvo-Armengol, Antoni & Jackson, Matthew O., 2005. "Like father, like son: Social networks, human capital investment, and social mobility," Working Papers 1242, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  6. Jon Reiersen, 2004. "Status and Incentives," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 30, pages 121-128. [Downloadable!]
  7. Fernando Vega Redondo, 1997. "- Unfolding Social Hierarchies In Large Population Games," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  8. Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci & Aldo Rustichini, 2008. "Social Decision Theory: Choosing within and between Groups," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 71, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
  9. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2008. "Which Inequality? The Inequality of Endowments Versus the Inequality of Rewards," ESE Discussion Papers 185, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  10. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2005. "Inequality and Growth in the Presence of Competition for Status," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000554, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Nabil I. Al-Najjar, 1998. "A Reputational Model of Authority," Discussion Papers 1223, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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