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Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching

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Author Info
Bettina Klaus
Flip Klijn ()

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Abstract

We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 582.03.

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Length: 16
Date of creation: 31 Jul 2003
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Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:582.03

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Related research
Keywords: procedural fairness; random mechanism; stability; two-sided matching;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jinpeng Ma, 1996. "On randomized matching mechanisms (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 377-381.
    Other versions:
  2. Herve Moulin, 2004. "Fair Division and Collective Welfare," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262633116.
  3. Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1990. "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1475-80, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Antonio Romero-Medina, 2005. "Equitable Selection in Bilateral Matching Markets," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 305-324, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Moulin, Hervé, 1997. "Procedural cum Endstate Justice: An Implementation Viewpoint," Working Papers 97-17, Duke University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Elette Boyle & Federico Echenique, 2009. "Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 87-99, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2006. "Median Stable Matching for College Admissions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 1-11, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2004. "Corrigendum to ''On Randomized Matching Mechanisms'' [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 628.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 31 Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2004. "Employment by Lotto Revisited," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 627.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 17 Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
  5. Karla Atkins & Achla Marathe & Chris Barrett, 2007. "A computational approach to modeling commodity markets," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 125-142, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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