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Procedural cum Endstate Justice: An Implementation Viewpoint

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  • Moulin, HervÈ

Abstract

Means matter as well as ends. In the context of the microeconomic allocation of resources, the familiar statement corresponds to the duality of procedural versus endstate justice; the tension between these two approaches is highlighted by the strategic implementation approach. It is argued that the strong requirement of strategyproofness provides the only context where the two approaches coincide for strategyproof mechanisms, and only for those, the justice of the mechanism is equivalent to that of its endstate. The literature on strategyproof allocation mechanisms is briefly reviewed, and its recent revival is emphasized.

Suggested Citation

  • Moulin, HervÈ, 1997. "Procedural cum Endstate Justice: An Implementation Viewpoint," Working Papers 97-17, Duke University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:duk:dukeec:97-17
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    Cited by:

    1. Joana Pais, 2008. "Random matching in the college admissions problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(1), pages 99-116, April.
    2. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2006. "Procedurally fair and stable matching," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(2), pages 431-447, January.
    3. Korpela, Ville, 2018. "Procedurally fair implementation under complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 25-31.
    4. R?bert F. Veszteg, 2004. "Fairness under Uncertainty with Indivisibilities," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 613.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    5. Korpela Ville, 2016. "Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry," Discussion Papers 108, Aboa Centre for Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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