Employment by Lotto Revisited
AbstractWe study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a matching algorithm for the so-called stable marriage problem. We complement Aldershof et al.'s analysis in two ways. First, we give an alternative and intuitive description of employment by lotto. Second, we disprove Aldershof et al.'s conjectures concerning employment by lotto for general matching markets.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 627.04.
Date of creation: 25 Oct 2004
Date of revision: 17 Jan 2006
employment by lotto; random mechanism; two-sided matching; stability;
Other versions of this item:
- C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2003.
"Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching,"
36, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
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