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Equitable Selection in Bilateral Matching Markets

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  • Antonio Romero-Medina

Abstract

This paper presents a procedure to select equitable stable allocations in two-sided matching markets without side payments. The Equitable set is computed using the Equitable algorithm. The algorithm limits the set of options available for each agent throughout the procedure. The stable matchings selected are generally not extreme, form a lattice and satisfy the condition of being “Ralwsianâ€\x9D in each partition of the market. The Equitable algorithm can also be used to select a particular matching from the Equitable Set favoring particular agents independent of the side of the market to which they belong. Copyright Springer 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Romero-Medina, 2005. "Equitable Selection in Bilateral Matching Markets," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 305-324, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:58:y:2005:i:3:p:305-324
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-005-6846-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1988. "Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 85-101, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. James Boudreau & Vicki Knoblauch, 2013. "Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 565-589, April.
    2. Kuvalekar, Aditya Vijay & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2021. "A fair procedure in a marriage market," UC3M Working papers. Economics 31711, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    3. Jay Sethuraman & Chung-Piaw Teo & Liwen Qian, 2006. "Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 31(3), pages 581-596, August.
    4. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2006. "Procedurally fair and stable matching," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(2), pages 431-447, January.
    5. Tom Demeulemeester & Juan S. Pereyra, 2022. "Rawlsian Assignments," Papers 2207.02930, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
    6. Boudreau, James W. & Knoblauch, Vicki, 2014. "What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 27-33.
    7. Piotr Dworczak, 2021. "Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 456-468, March.

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